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Abstract
This thesis comprises of two separate game theoretic models that fall under the general
umbrella of network formation games. The first is a coalitional model of interaction in social
networks that is based on the idea of social distance, in which players seek interactions with
similar others. Our model captures some of the phenomena observed on such networks,
such as homophily driven interactions and the formation of small worlds for groups of
players. Using social distance games, we analyze the interactions between players on the
network, study the properties of efficient and stable networks, relate them to the underlying
graphical structure of the game, and give an approximation algorithm for finding optimal
social welfare. We then show that efficient networks are not necessarily stable, and stable
networks do not necessarily maximise welfare. We use the stability gap to investigate the
welfare of stable coalition structures, and propose two new solution concepts with improved
welfare guarantees.
The second model is a compact formulation of matchings with externalities. Our for-
mulation achieves tractability of the representation at the expense of full expressivity. We
formulate a template of solution concept that applies to games where externalities are in-
volved, and instantiate it in the context of optimistic, neutral, and pessimistic reasoning.
Then we investigate the complexity of the representation in the context of many-to-many
and one-to-one matchings, and provide both computational hardness results and polyno-
mial time algorithms where applicable.
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Game theory provides a rich mathematical framework for analysing interactions among
self interested parties. Coalitional games study the dynamics of players that interact to
accomplish more together than they would individually. The central questions in coalitional
game theory are how the players should cooperate and how the payoffs should be divided
among the members of a coalition.
In recent years there has been growing interest in the field and many new classes of
games have been formalised. One of the main driving forces behind the development of new
games was the emergence of the internet, with applications such as internet architecture,
routing, peer-to-peer systems, and viral marketing. As Scott Shenker famously said, “The
Internet is an equilibrium, we just need to identify the game” [40]. Another important
line of research that contributed to the development of coalitional games was inspired
from social and economic networks ( [17], [29]). Social networks influence all aspects of
everyday life, such as where people live, work, what music they listen to, and with whom
they interact. Early work on social networks was done by Milgram in the 1960’s and
his experiments indicated that any two people in the world are connected by a path of
average length six. This idea is also known as the “six degrees of separation” hypothesis.
Since then, researchers observed that many natural networks, such as the web, biological
networks, networks of scientific collaboration, exhibit the same properties as the web of
human acquaintances. The emergence of online communities such as Facebook, MySpace,
and LinkedIn has enabled a much more detailed analysis of real networks.
Several areas of interest can be identified in network formation research. One line
of work includes the study of random graph models that exhibit the same characteris-
tics as those observed in real social networks, such as heavy-tailed degree distribution
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and the small world phenomenon. Among these, we mention the small world model of
Kleinberg [31] and preferential attachment models [29]. A separate line of work focuses
on strategic network formation, in which the nodes represent self interested entities with
different incentives for maintaining or cutting links in the network. Research in network
formation literature focuses on understanding issues such as how the structure of the net-
work influences the behaviour of the players, what type of equilibria arise, which players
are influential, and which networks are efficient. The study of network formation games
has in turn led to important theoretical concepts and new analysis tools.
This thesis comprises of two separate game theoretic models that fall under the general
umbrella of network formation games. The first is a coalitional model of interaction in social
networks that is based on the idea of social distance, in which players seek interactions with
similar others. We rely on a centrality-based measure of utility and analyze the interactions
between the players from the point of view of coalitional game theory. The second is a
compact model of matchings with externalities. Our formulation achieves tractability
of the representation at the expense of full expressivity. We formulate a template of
solution concept that applies to games where externalities are involved, and instantiate it
in the context of optimistic, neutral, and pessimistic reasoning. Then we investigate the
complexity of the representation in the context of many-to-many and one-to-one matchings,
and provide both computational hardness results and polynomial time algorithms where
applicable.
1.1 Contributions
In this thesis we propose and analyze two separate game theoretic models, that fall under
the general umbrella of social and economic network formation.
The first main contribution is formulating and analyzing the class of social distance
games, a coalitional model of interaction in social networks. We define the game using
a network centrality utility measure, investigate the social welfare and stability of social
distance games using the core solution concept, provide a polynomial-time algorithm to
approximate optimal social welfare that also satisfies a notion of fairness, and formulate
two alternative stability solution concepts with improved welfare guarantees. Besides the
technical contribution, social distance games are among the first models to use coalitional
game theory for analyzing interactions in network formation.
The second main contribution is formulating the first compact model of externalities for
matchings, and formalizing a general stability notion, called Γ stability, which applies to
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any coalitional game with externalities. We instantiate Γ stability in the context of many-
to-many and one-to-one matchings. In many-to-many matchings, we consider optimism,
neutrality, pessimism, and contractual stability. In one-to-one matchings, we investigate
optimism, neutrality, and pessimism. We provide polynomial-time algorithms in the case
of pairwise stability under pessimism and neutrality, and hardness results for optimistic
pairwise stability and the core solution concept under all the stability notions considered.
We also note that our model of matchings with compact externalities is one of the very
first models of compact externalities in the computer science literature.
1.2 Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we present background mate-
rial on graph theory and measures of centrality from social networks. Then we formulate
the coalitional model of interaction and study its properties using social welfare, the core
solution concept, and two refined coalitional solution concepts with improved welfare guar-
antees.
In Chapter 3 we present some background material on matchings and introduce the
compact model of matchings with externalities. We study the model in many-to-many
and one-to-one matchings, provide several different properties, complexity results, and
polynomial algorithms where applicable.
In Chapter 4, we review our conclusions and discuss ideas for future work.
3
Chapter 2
A Coalitional Model of Interaction in
Social Networks
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we formulate a model of interaction on social networks using coalitional
game theory and the notion of social distance. Our game captures the idea that social
networks exhibit homophily, and so players prefer to maintain ties with other players
who are close to them. Using social distance games, we analyze the interactions between
players on the network, study the properties of efficient and stable networks, relate them
to the underlying graphical structure of the game, and give an approximation algorithm
for finding optimal social welfare. We then show that efficient networks are not necessarily
stable, and stable networks do not necessarily maximise welfare. We use the stability
gap to investigate the welfare of stable coalition structures, and propose two new solution
concepts with improved welfare guarantees.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Coalitional Games
Coalitional game theory focuses on how groups of players can accomplish more together
than they would individually [45]. One of the main representations in coalitional game
theory is that of characteristic function form.
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Definition 1 (Characteristic Function Form). A game in characteristic function form is
a pair (N, v), where
• N is a set of players
• v is a real-valued function on the family of subsets of N , such that v(S) represents
the value that the members of coalition S ⊆ N can achieve together.
Coalitional games can be divided in two broad categories, namely transferable utility
(TU) and nontransferable utility (NTU) games. Transferable utility games assume that
the players can freely redistribute among themselves the payoffs of the coalition. In that
case, v(S) can be specified with a unique real value. In nontransferable utility games, the
players are not allowed to make transfers, and so the characteristic function v returns a set
of payoff vectors, rather than a single value. Nontransferable utility games are the most
general class of games in characteristic function form and contain the class of transferable
utility games.
Definition 2 (Nontransferable Utility Game). A coalitional game with non-transferable
utility is a pair (N, v) such that
• N is a set of players
• v : 2N → 2R|S| associates each coalition S ⊂ N with a set of value vectors v(S) ⊆
R|S|, which is the set of different payoffs that coalition S can achieve for each of its
members.
The set of players, N , is also known as the grand coalition.
Definition 3 (Coalition Structure). A coalition structure is a partition P = (C1, . . . , Cm)
of the grand coalition into coalitions Ci such that ∪mi=1Ci = N and Ci ∩ Cj = ∅,∀i 6= j.
Hedonic games are a general subclass of nontransferable utility games that have been
studied in economics [8] and more recently received attention in computer science [20, 10,
4]. In hedonic games, the utility of a player in a coalition is completely determined by the
identity of the other members of that coalition.
Definition 4 (Hedonic Game). A hedonic game is a pair (N ; (i)i∈N), where for every
player i ∈ N , i is a reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relation on the subsets of
N that contain i.
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Alternatively, hedonic games can be defined as nontransferable utility games in which
for every coalition S, v(S) contains exactly one payoff vector.
Definition 5. A hedonic game is a nontransferable utility coalitional game (N, v) in which
v(S) is a unique vector such that for every player i ∈ S, vi(S) is the payoff of player i
while a member of coalition S.
Hedonic games require an exponential representation, as every player has to keep a list
of length 2|N | − 1 of preferences over all the possible coalitions in N . Thus any questions
related to the complexity of determining outcomes in such games are trivially exponential
in the number of players. Several compact representations of hedonic games have been
studied, among which additively separable hedonic games.
Definition 6 (Additively Separable Hedonic Game). An additively separable hedonic game
is a hedonic game (N, v), where the payoff of a player i as a member of coalition S can be
computed additively as vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vi(j), where vi(j) is the amount that player i receives
from player j.
Additively separable hedonic games can also be represented as a weighted directed
graph [10], such that every player is a node in the graph, and the weight of the edge (i, j)
is the amount that player i receives from j when they are in the same coalition.
The central questions studied in hedonic games and more generally, in coalitional game
theory, are related to social welfare and stability. We define social welfare and the required
stability concepts for games with coalition structures.
Definition 7 (Social Welfare). The social welfare of a coalition structure P = (C1, . . . , Cm)
is






where vk(Ci) is the utility of player k while a member of coalition Ci.
We will sometimes refer to the utility of player k while a member of coalition Ci in
partition P as vk(P ).
One the most important stability solution concepts in coalitional game theory is the
core.
Definition 8 (Core). A coalition structure P = (C1, . . . , Cm) is in the core if there is no
coalition B ⊆ N , B 6= Ci, ∀i = 1,m such that ∀i ∈ B, vi(B) ≥ vi(P ) and for some j ∈ B
the inequality is strict: vj(B) > vj(P ). If all the inequalities are strict then P is in the
weak core.
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If coalition structure P is in the core, then P is resistant against group deviations. No
coalition can deviate and improve the utility of at least one member, while not degrading
the other ones. If B exists, then it is called a blocking coalition.
The core is a strong notion of stability that can be empty in many games. Thus we
define several weaker notions of stability which are often studied in the context of hedonic
games.
Definition 9 (Nash Stability). A coalition structure P = (C1, . . . , Cm) satisfies Nash
stability if no player i can improve their utility by leaving their current coalition C(i) and
either (1) moving to a different coalition C
′
(i) ∈ P , or (2) forming the singleton coalition
{i}.
Individual stability is a stronger variant of Nash stability, which stipulates that a player
cannot enter a new coalition unless they receive approval from the members of that coali-
tion.
Definition 10 (Individual Stability). A coalition structure P = (C1, . . . , Cm) satisfies
individual stability if no player i can improve their utility by leaving their current coalition
C(i) and either (1) forming the singleton {i}, or (2) moving to a different coalition C ′(i) ∈
P , assuming that none of the players in C
′
(i) degrade upon i’s arrival.
An even stronger version of Nash stability is contractual individual stability, which
stipulates that a player can deviate from their current coalition to a new one only if they
have the approval of both their current coalition members and the members of the coalition
they are entering.
Definition 11 (Contractual Individual Stability). A coalition structure P = (C1, . . . , Cm)
satisfies individual stability if no player i can improve their utility by leaving their current
coalition C(i) and either (1) forming the singleton {i}, or (2) moving to a different coalition
C
′
(i) ∈ P , assuming that none of the players in C ′(i) degrade upon i’s arrival and none of
the players in C(i) are hurt by i leaving the coalition.
A variant of core stability is inner stability, which requires that no group deviations
occur within the same coalition.
Definition 12 (Inner Stability). A coalition structure P = (C1, . . . , Cm) satisfies inner
stability if there exists no blocking coalition B ⊂ Ci, for some Ci ∈ P .
If a coalition structure exhibits inner stability then any blocking coalition must “cross
coalition boundaries” by drawing members from at least two different coalitions. In certain
situations, the cost of crossing coalition boundaries can be prohibitive.
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2.2.2 Social Networks
We first introduce some standard notions from graph theory that are used in the remainder
of this chapter.
Definition 13 (Diameter). The diameter of a graph G is the longest shortest path between
any two vertices of G.
Definition 14 (Induced Subgraph). An induced subgraph of a graph G = (V,E) is a




), such that V
′ ⊆ V , and for all vertices s, v ∈ V ′, the edge (s, v) ∈ E ′
if and only if (s, v) ∈ E.
Centrality measures are some of the most important and frequently used measures
of social network structure. Centrality captures the relative importance of a node in
the network. Next we present several widely used measures of centrality, namely degree
centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, and eigenvector centrality. As usual
in graph theory, we denote a graph by G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E is
the set of edges. We denote by |V | = n the number of nodes in the graph.





Betweenness centrality is a measure that assigns a high score to vertices that are situated
on many shortest paths. Intuitively, such nodes are bridges between many other nodes.
Such bridges are of special value to individuals, and their significance in social networks
has been documented by many studies, such as [24].
Definition 16 (Betweenness Centrality). The betweenness centrality of a vertex v in the






Closeness centrality is a measure that assigns a high score to vertices which tend to
be close to every other vertex. Closeness centrality is positively correlated with other
measures, such as the degree of a vertex.
Definition 17 (Closeness Centrality). The closeness centrality of a vertex v in the graph
G = (V,E) is
CC(v) =
1∑
t∈V \{v} d(v, t)
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There exist many alternate measures of closeness centrality. Among them, we men-
tion a popular variant introduced by Latora and Machiori [33], which is well-defined on
disconnected graphs.
Definition 18 (Latora-Marchiori Closeness Centrality). The Latora-Marchiori closeness







In this section we introduce social distance games and key concepts from the literature. We
assume the reader is familiar with basic graph theoretic notions including shortest path,
complete graph, and induced subgraph.
Our utility formulation is based on the concept of social distance, which is the number
of hops required to reach one node to another, and has become famous since Milgram’s
study on six degrees of separation. The utility function reflects the principle of homophily,
that similarity breeds connection and people tend to form communities with similar oth-
ers [36]. Homophily has been repeatedly observed in many real world networks, such as
marriage, friendship, work, and voluntary organizations. In addition, it can be observed
that large groups of people interacting at the same time, such as at a party, easily break
into smaller components that ensure high centrality for each of the participants. Our model
of interaction predicts some of these phenomena.
Definition 19. A social distance game is represented as a simple unweighted graph G =
(N,E) where
• N = {x1, . . . , xn} is the set of players








where dC(xi, xj) is the shortest path distance between xi and xj in the subgraph induced
by coalition C on the graph G. If xi and xj are disconnected in C, then dC(xi, xj) =
∞.
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If we view the inverse social distance as similarity, the utility of a player in a coalition is
defined as the average similarity of the player to that coalition. A singleton player always
receives zero. To be consistent, we define the similarity of a player to himself as zero, and
so when computing the utility of a player in a coalition C, we divide by the size of C.
Our utility formulation is related to all the centrality measures introduced ( ??). In
particular, it is a variant of closeness centrality, which is well defined on disconnected
sets and normalized in the interval [0, 1]. Moreover, it is related to several other classical
measures from network analysis, such as degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector
centrality [23], all of which are used to determine how a node is embedded in the network.
Our main goal is to understand the dynamics generated by homophily driven communities,
and so this utility function has a number of desirable properties that reflect the sociable
nature of the players.
Property 1. A player prefers direct connections over indirect ones. In general, the player
prefers a connection by a factor inversely proportional with the distance to that connection.
Property 2. Adding a close connection positively affects a player’s utility.
Moreover, our improvement function reflects diminishing returns. An additional friend
benefits everyone, but the added benefit depends on how many friends the player already
has.
Property 3. Adding a distant connection negatively affects a player’s utility.
Property 3 states that players who want to be central in their coalition experience loss
in social status because of distant connections.
Property 4. All things being equal, players favour larger coalitions.
In this work, we assume coalitions are connected, since a disconnected coalition can
improve everyone’s utility by splitting into its connected components, and that the in-
put graph is connected, since disconnected graphs can be analyzed componentwise. We
emphasize a coalition is defined on the subgraph it induces on the original graph.
2.4 Social Welfare
We are interested in understanding the properties of social welfare maximising structures
in social distance games. These structures can be viewed as the best outcomes for the
society overall. The next properties follow immediately from the definition of the model.
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Property 5. On complete graphs, the grand coalition is the only welfare maximising coali-
tion structure.
Property 6. The welfare of any coalition structure is bounded by n− 1. The upper bound
is only attained by the grand coalition on complete graphs.
From Property 5, the grand coalition is welfare-maximising on complete graphs. How-
ever, the grand coalition is still welfare maximising on complete bipartite graphs (such as
a star), which can be significantly sparser. In addition, complete bipartite graphs have
diameter two, and thus the grand coalition is both optimal and gives utility at least 1/2
to each player.
Theorem 1. The grand coalition maximises social welfare on complete bipartite graphs.
Proof. A bipartite graph is a triplet G = (>,⊥, E), where > and ⊥ are disjoint sets of
vertices, and E = {(x, y)|x ∈ >, y ∈ ⊥} are the edges. Let |>| = m and |⊥| = n. Let





















Let P = {C1, . . . , Ck} be another partition, where |Ci| = mi + ni, and mi and ni are
the number of nodes from > and ⊥, respectively. Each coalition Ci is a complete bipartite
graph, and so it satisfies Equation 2.1. Moreover mi ≥ 1 and ni ≥ 1, since otherwise Ci
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would have welfare zero.
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≤ (m1 +m2)(n1 + n2)
m1 +m2 + n1 + n2
Equivalently, (m1m2 −m2m1)2 ≥ 0, which holds trivially. Using this fact, the welfare of
P can be improved by joining coalitions Ck−1 and Ck:
SW (C1, . . . Ck−2, {Ck−1 ∪ Ck}) > SW (C1, . . . , Ck)
We can transform P into Km,n by iteratively joining pairs of coalitions. Since social welfare
increases with every join, it follows that the grand coalition maximises welfare.
2.4.1 An Approximation of Optimal Welfare
Finding the optimal welfare partition can be shown to be NP-hard on social distance
games via a reduction from Partition into Triangles. In this section we give an algorithm
to approximate optimal welfare within a factor of two. The algorithm decomposes the
graph into connected components, such that each component has diameter less than or
equal to two, and no component is a singleton. We call this type of partition a diameter
two decomposition of the graph.
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Theorem 2. Diameter two decompositions guarantee to each player utility at least 1/2.
Proof. Let G be a graph, P a diameter two decomposition of G, C a coalition in P , and
xi ∈ C a player. Let a and b the number of players in distance one and two from xi,









C is not a singleton, thus xi has at least one direct neighbour in C, and so a ≥ 1. Using
Equation 2.2, we get u(xi) ≥ 1/2.
The diameter two decomposition is an approximation of optimal welfare that satisfies
at the same time a notion of fairness : every player is guaranteed to receive more than half
of their best possible value. In general, welfare maximising and core stable partitions do
not necessarily ensure that every player receives at least 1/2.
Algorithm 1 Fair Approximation of Optimal Welfare
1: T ← Minimum-Spanning-Tree(G);
2: k ← 1;
3: while |T | ≥ 2 do
4: xk ← Deepest-Leaf(T);
5: Ck ← {Parent(xk)};
6: for all y ∈ Children(Parent(xk)) do
7: Ck ← Ck ∪ {y};
8: end for
9: // Remove vertices Ck and their edges from T
10: T ← T − Ck;
11: k ← k + 1;
12: end while
13: // If the root is left, add it to the current coalition
14: if |T | = 1 then
15: Ck ← Ck ∪ {Root(T )};
16: end if
17: return (C1, . . . , Ck);
Algorithm 2.4.1 finds a diameter two decomposition of the graph. Let T be a minimum
spanning tree of G. Iteratively remove stars from T , starting from the bottom leaves. In
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each iteration i, let xi be a leaf of maximum depth. Place xi and Parent(xi), the parent
of xi, in the same coalition Ci, together with all the direct children of Parent(xi). The
tree remains connected after each such removal, since otherwise there must have been a
leaf of greater depth than xi. In the last iteration, k, there may be only one node left,
namely Root(T ), the root of the tree. In that case, add Root(T ) to coalition Ck. Note that
Root(T ) is still distance at most two from all the nodes in Ck.
Computing the minimum spanning tree requires time O(n), where n is the size of the
graph. A stack of nodes in decreasing order by depth in the tree can be precomputed
in O(n). Each iteration requires popping one element from the stack, visiting its parent
together with any potential siblings, and removing the visited nodes from the tree. Since
every node is visited exactly once, and the number of operations per node is constant, the
algorithm runs in O(n) steps.
Corollary 1. The optimal welfare partition attains at least n/2, where n is the number of
vertices.
Proof. Immediate given that Algorithm 2.4.1 always returns a diameter two decomposition,
with welfare at least n/2.
A variation of this algorithm can be used to obtain a partition which in addition to
giving utility at least 1/2 to each player, also satisfies internal stability. Also, note that
the constant diameter holds more generally for partitions satisfying internal stability.
2.5 The Core
Group stability is an important concept in coalitional games. No matter how many de-
sirable properties a coalition structure satisfies, if there exist groups of players that can
deviate and improve their utility by doing so, then that configuration can be easily under-
mined. We investigate properties of the core in social distance games.
Property 7. On complete graphs, the grand coalition is the only core stable coalition
structure.
Theorem 3. The grand coalition is core-stable on complete bipartite graphs.
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Proof. We show that the grand coalition Km,n is not blocked. Assume by contradiction
that there exists a blocking coalition B. Denote p = |> ∩ B| and q = |⊥ ∩ B|, where
p+ q = |B|, and let x ∈ B> and y ∈ B⊥. For B to be blocking, it must be the case that
u(x,Km,n) ≤ u(x,B) and u(y,Km,n) ≤ u(y,B)
This is equivalent to:
2n+m− 1
m+ n





≤ 2p+ q − 1
p+ q
By summing these inequalities it follows that m+n ≤ p+q, which is a contradiction, since
B is a strict subset of Km,n.
There exist social distance games for which the core is empty, such as the game in
Figure 2.1. The grand coalition is blocked by {1, 2, 4, 5}, partition ({0, 3}, {1, 2, 4, 5}) is
blocked by {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Similar examples exist for the weak core. However, if the graph
is a tree, the weak core always exists and can be found in polynomial time.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 2.4.1 returns a weak core partition when the graph is a tree.
Proof. (sketch) Let P = (C1, . . . , Ck) be the diameter two decomposition returned by the
algorithm. If G is a tree, then every coalition Ci is a star. Note that the leaves of G are
not involved in any blocking coalition, because they already receive 1/2, the maximum
amount possible for them. The parent node of any leaf is in coalition with all its direct
neighbours, except for its own parent. Since the leaves refuse to block, the parents of the
leaves cannot hope to strictly improve utility, and so they will not block either. Iteratively,
it can be verified that no vertex can be part of a blocking coalition, and so P is core-stable
in the weak sense.
The partition returned by Algorithm 2.4.1 also satisfy some weaker notions of stability.
Lemma 1. The partition returned by Algorithm 2.4.1 satisfies Nash stability and contrac-
tual individual stability.
Next we present a variant of Algorithm 2.4.1 which, in addition to ensuring fairness,
satisfies inner stability.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 2.5 returns a partition a fair approximation of optimal welfare
which satisfies inner stability.
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Algorithm 2 Innerly Stable Approximation of Optimal Welfare
1: k ← −1;
2: while N ≥ ∅ do
3: k ← k + 1;
4: if there is z ∈ N, deg(z) = 1 then
5: x← N(z); // x is z’s only neighbour
6: S ← {y ∈ N(x)|deg(y) = 1};
7: // S are x’s neighbours of degree one, including z
8: Ck ← {x} ∪ S;
9: else
10: Pick random neighbours x, y ∈ N ;
11: S ← {z ∈ N(x) ∩N(y)|deg(z) = 2};
12: // S are the nodes connected only to x and y
13: Ck ← {x} ∪ {y} ∪ S;
14: end if
15: N ← N \ Ck;
16: end while
17: return (C1, . . . , Ck);
Proof. Let P = (C1, . . . Ck) be the coalition structure returned by Algorithm 2.5. By
construction, every coalition Ci has one of the following forms:
• Star : Ci = {x, z1, . . . , zp}. Ci clearly gives utility at least 1/2 to all its members.
Agent x cannot be involved in a blocking coalition, since they are connected to all
the players in Ci, and so any blocking coalition B ⊂ Ci would decrease x’s utility.
None of the players zj can block in the absence of x, since the zj’s are not connected
to each other. Thus in this case, Ci satisfies inner stability.
• Union of two stars with identical leaves but different centers : Ci = {x, y, z1, . . . , zp},
where E(x, y) = 1, E(x, zj) = 1, and E(y, zj) = 1, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Agents x
and y are connected to all the members of Ci, and so any blocking coalition would
decrease their utility. The players zj are not connected to each other, and so none of
the zj s can block without x and y. Again, Ci satisfies inner stability. It is immediate
to verify that Ci has diameter at most two, and so it gives utility at least 1/2 to all
of its players.
At the end of every iteration, Algorithm 2.5 updates the set N to remove from consideration
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coalition Ci. By induction, the algorithm decomposes the graph into a partition with the
required properties.
We note that unlike Algorithm 2.4.1, the partition returned by Algorithm 2.5 does
not necessarily belong to the core when the graph is a tree. In addition, the coalitions
returned by Algorithm 2.5 tend to be smaller than those returned by Algorithm 2.4.1, and
so the appropriate algorithm may depend on the situation at hand. Algorithm 2.5 can be
implemented to run in O(n2) using adjacency lists.
2.5.1 Core Partitions are Small Worlds
A small world network is a graph in which most nodes can be reached from any other
node using a small number of steps through intermediate nodes. The expected diameter
of small world networks is O(ln(n)). Most real networks display the small world property,
and examples range from genetic and neural networks to the world wide web [5]. In this
model, core stable partitions divide the players into small world coalitions, regardless of
how wide the original graph was. We obtained an upper bound of 14 on the diameter of
any coalition in the core. The tight bound is likely even lower.
Theorem 6. The diameter of any coalition belonging to a core partition is bounded by a
constant.
Proof. Let C be a coalition belonging to a core partition. Denote |C| = c, D the diameter
of C, and x0, y two players with dC(x0, y) = D. Divide C into sets (C0 = {x0}, C1, . . . , CD),
and define
• A = C0 ∪ C1 ∪ . . . ∪ CbD
4
c
• B = CbD
4
c+1 ∪ . . . ∪ CbD
2
c
• Γ = CbD
2
c+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cb 3D
4
c
• ∆ = Cb 3D
4
c+1 ∪ . . . ∪ CD
where |A| = α, |B| = β, |Γ| = γ, |∆| = δ, and α + β + γ + δ = c.
Let x1 ∈ C1. Agent x0 is connected to all of C1, and so it is connected to x1. C is in
the core, thus coalition {x0, x1} is not blocking, and so at least one of x0, x1 obtains utility
17
1/2. Observe that players x0 and x1 prefer B, Γ, and ∆ to be small, because the players
in those sets are distant and contribute to decreasing x0 and x1’s utility. Bounding the
utilities of x0 and x1, we obtain:
1
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Similarly, let xD ∈ CD. Agent xD can be directly connected only to players in CD and
CD−1. There must exist a path from x0 to xD that passes through CD−1, thus there is
xD−1 ∈ CD−1 neighbour of xD. Then
1
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Use D′ to get simplified (coarser) bounds:
1
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(D′ − 6)(β + γ) ≤ 4
3
(α + δ) (2.5)




c+1. There is a
path from xbD
2
c+1 to x0 that passes through CbD
2































if and only if
(D′ − 8)(α + δ) ≤ D′(β + γ) (2.6)
Multiplying inequalities 2.5 and 2.6, we get:
(D′ − 8)(D′ − 6) ≤ 4
3
D′
Solving for integer D′ and taking into account that D ≥ 8, it follows that D′ ≤ 10, and so
D ≤ 14.
2.6 Stability Gap
We observed from the empty core game in Figure 2.1 that maximum welfare partitions are
not always stable, and from Figure 2.2 that stable partitions do not necessarily maximise
welfare. We analyse the loss of welfare that comes from being in the core using the notion
of stability gap [10], which is the ratio between the best possible welfare and the welfare
of a core stable partition (if it exists). The worst case and best case performance of a
core member are measured by the minimum and maximum stability gap, respectively. The
stability gap parallels the prices of anarchy and stability [40].
Let P ∗ be a welfare maximising coalition structure and PC a member of the core. In
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Figure 2.2: The core and welfare maximising partitions do not coincide. The
core is ({x0, x1, x2, x3, x4}). Welfare is maximised by ({x0, x1, x4}, {x2, x3}) and
({x0, x4}, {x1, x2, x3})
the best case, PC is also a welfare maximiser. Since it is possible that no core member
attains the welfare of P ∗, the quantity
Gapmin(G) =
SW (P ∗)
minP∈Core(G) SW (P )
measures the worst case ratio. We show the worst case bound for the stability gap of social
distance games is Θ(
√
n). In order to get the bound, we use a few lemmas.
Lemma 2. If a player has utility greater than 1/2 in a coalition, then all its direct neigh-
bours from the same coalition have utility at least 1/4.
Proof. Let C be a coalition and xi, xj ∈ C two neighbouring players such that u(xi, C) >



















For every z 6= xi, xj, the shortest path distance between xj and z passes, in worst case,
through xi. Thus the inequality d(xj, z) ≤ d(xi, z) + 1 holds, and we can bound the utility
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Lemma 3. If P is a partition in the core and x, y two players adjacent in G, then at least
one of x, y attains utility greater than or equal to 1/2 in P .
Proof. Assume by contradiction that none of the conditions hold. Then there exists ad-
jacent pair x, y with u(x, P ) ≤ 1/2 and u(y, P ) < 1/2, or viceversa. But then coalition
{x, y} is blocking, since it gives utility 1/2 to each player, contradition with P being core
stable.
Corollary 2. The welfare of any non-singleton coalition in a core stable partition is at
least 1/4 of the maximum possible for that coalition.
Proof. Let P be the core-stable partition, and Ti, Di, and Fi denote the sets of players in Ci
with utilities strictly greater than 1/2, equal to 1/2, and strictly less than 1/2, respectively.
Denote ti = |Ti|, di = |Di|, fi = |Fi|, and ci = |Ci|. The sets Ti, Di, and Fi are disjoint, Ti
is non-empty, and Ti ∪Di ∪ Fi = Ci.
From Lemmas 2 and 3, each player y ∈ Fi is surrounded only by players x ∈ Ti. Since





















Proof. Let partition P ∗ be welfare maximising and P = (C1, . . . , Ck, S1, . . . , Ss) in the
core, where ci ≥ 2, i = 1, k, and |Sj| = 1, j = 1, s. Let Ti, Di, and Fi denote the sets of
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players in Ci with utilities strictly greater than 1/2, equal to 1/2, and strictly less than
1/2, respectively. Denote ti = |Ti|, di = |Di|, fi = |Fi|, and ci = |Ci|. The sets Ti, Di, and
Fi are disjoint, Ti is non-empty, and Ti ∪Di ∪ Fi = Ci.
From Lemmas 2 and 3, each singleton Si can only be connected to players in T1, . . . , Tk.
In addition, u(xij) ≤ ci−1ci , ∀xij ∈ Ti ⊂ Ci. Thus each such xij can be connected (in G) to
at most ci − 1 singletons, because otherwise xij and the singletons would form a blocking


















Consider n fixed and find an upper bound for s, which in turn gives an upper bound
for 4n
n−s . Observe that each player in coalition Ci has at most ci − 2 singletons connected











2 = (n− s)2
From s < n and s ≤ (n− s)2, it follows that s ≤ n−
√









To complete the proof, we give a Θ(
√
n) example. Let G be such that N = C ∪ S,
C = {x1, . . . , xc} is a clique, S = {y1, . . . , ys} an independent set, with |C| = c and |S| = s.
In addition, each player y ∈ S is connected to exactly one x ∈ C, and each x ∈ C has
exactly c − 2 direct neighbous in S, which we denote as S(x). Thus s = c(c − 2), and so
n = c2 − c. Note that while n cannot be any integer, there are arbitrarily large n of this
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The optimal welfare partition, P ∗, is such that each player x ∈ C forms a coalition
with its set S(x). Agent x has utility c−2
c−1 , while each player in S(x) gets 1/2. Thus,










Partition P ∗ is not stable because C is blocking, but P = (C, {y1}, . . . , {ys}) is in the core.
Each player in C gets c−1
c
, while everyone in S obtains zero:












n− 1 ∈ Θ(
√
n)
Better bounds for the gap can be obtained depending on the underlying graph model.
Here we consider dense graphs, which are common in social networks, and show their
stability gap is small.












is at most 4
1−ε , where ε ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. For ε = 0, the inequality simply states that the number of edges is non-negative.
For ε = 1, it requires that the graph is complete: m ≥ n(n−1)
2
.
We observe that the singletons in the core form an independent set, since otherwise they
could organize themselves into coalitions and improve their welfare by doing so. Let α be
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the the independence number of the graph. From the fact that a graph with independence



















+ n(n− 1)− 2m
From Inequality 2.9, we get that α ≤ εn, and so any core configuration has at most εn
singletons. From Corollary 2, the welfare of the remaining (1−ε)n players is at least 1−ε
4
n,











edges has a gap
bounded by eight.
The Erdős-Rényi random graph model is perhaps the best known and widely studied
method for generating random graphs [15].
Theorem 9. The expected stability gap of graphs generated under the Erdős-Rényi G(n, p)
graph model is bounded by 4
1−2 log(n)/n whenever p ≥ 1/2.
Proof. It is known that the expected independence number of G(n, 1/2) graphs is α ≤
2 log(n), and in general, G(n, p) graphs have α ≤ 2 log(n) whenever p ≥ 1/2. The gap can







For large graphs, the bound is four.
2.7 Alternative Solution Concepts
From Theorem 7, the stability gap can be as high as Θ(
√
n). In this section we consider
several variations of the core with improved social support.
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2.7.1 Stability Threshold
Recall that a player achieves his best possible utility in a coalition with his direct neighbours
and no-one else. Moreover, the improvement function satisfies diminishing returns, and
so the higher a player’s utility, the harder it is to improve it. The stability threshold
is descriptive of situations where players naturally stop seeking improvements once they
achieved a minimum value. This is a well-known assumption observed experimentally as
a form of bounded rationality: choosing outcomes which might not be optimal, but will
make the players sufficiently happy.
We analyse stability for a threshold of k/(k+1), which is equivalent to a player forming
a coalition with k of his direct neighbours. In this case, there can be at most k−1 singletons
neighbouring any player with utility at least 1/2 in the core, since otherwise the singletons
can block with that player.
Theorem 10. Let G = (N,E) be an induced subgraph game with nonempty core of thresh-
old k/(k + 1). Then Gapmin(G) ≤ 4 if k = 1, and Gapmin(G) ≤ 2k if k ≥ 2.
Proof. We use the notation in Corollary 2. Let P = (C1, . . . , Cm, S1, . . . , Ss) be a core-
stable partition with threshdold k, where coalitions Si are singletons. For each player in











Let T = ∪mi=1Ti, D = ∪mi=1Di, F = ∪mi=1Fi, S = ∪mi=1Si and denote |T | = t, |D| = d,
|F | = f , |S| = s. Given that SW (Si) = 0, we can use Inequality 2.10 to obtain
























We also have that
n = t+ d+ f + s ≤ t+ d+ f + (k − 1)t = kt+ d+ f












) = 4kt+ 4d+ 4f
2t+ 2d+ f
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If k ≥ 2, the inequality guarantees that Gapmin(G) < 2k. If k = 1, the best bound we get
is Gapmin(G) < 4. Note, however, that for k = 1, Gapmax(G) = 2, since the diameter two
decomposition of G is core-stable with threshold k = 1.
2.7.2 The “No Man Left Behind” Policy
From Corollary 2, the core guarantees average utility greater than 1/4 to every non-
singleton coalition. Thus the reason for which the core welfare can be low is because
there exist networks in which many players are left alone in equilibrium.
Here we view the formation of core stable structures as a process that starts from the
grand coalition and stabilizes through rounds of coalitions splitting and merging. While the
search for equilibrium can begin from any partition, we observe that initializing with the
grand coalition is natural in many situations. For example, at the beginning of any joint
project, a group of people gather to work on it. However, as the project progresses, they
may form subgroups based on the compatibilities and strength of social ties between them.
We formulate a simple social rule that players have to follow when merging or splitting
coalitions. That is, whenever a new group forms, it cannot leave behind any player working
alone. We call this rule the “No Man Left Behind” policy. The “No Man Left Behind”
code of conduct is well known in the army and refers to the fact that no soldier can be left
alone in a mission or abandoned in case of injury.
Lemma 4. If P = (C1, . . . , Cm) is stable under the “No Man Left Behind” policy, then
for any two direct neighbours x, y ∈ Ci ∈ P it cannot be the case that both x and y receive
less than 1/2.
Proof. Assume, similarly to the proof for Lemma 3, that there exist adjacent players x, y ∈
Ci such that u(x) < 1/2 and u(y) < 1/2. Agents x and y can block to improve their utility.
However, by the “No Man Left Behind” Policy, they cannot deviate as a pair if they leave
singletons behind. Let Z(x) and Z(y) be the players that become singletons when x and
y deviate, where x is connected to the players in Z(x), and y to Z(y). Thus x and y can
deviate with coalition:
B′ = {x, y} ∪ Z(x) ∪ Z(y)
Both x and y are in distance at most two from all the players in B′, and so u(x,B′) ≥ 1/2
and u(y,B′) ≥ 1/2.
Theorem 11. Let G be a game which is stable under the “No Man Left Behind” policy.
Then Gapmin(G) < 4.
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Proof. Let P = (C1, . . . , Cm) be a stable partition. From the requirements of the policy,
each coalition Ci has size at least two. From Lemma 4 and Corollary 2, we get that
SW (P ) =
k∑
i=1


















Social distance games are a compact model that can be placed in the general context
of hedonic games [7]. Alon et al. [2] propose a graph-based model and uncover the
relationship between the existence of Nash equilibrium and the graph’s diameter. Bloch
and Jackson [6] analyse network formation games among players whose payoffs depend on
the structure of the network, using the stability notions of Nash equilibrium and pairwise
stability. In their formulation, players derive utility from forming links to other players in
the network, but have to pay explicitely for maintaining those links. Aadithya et al. [1]
propose efficient algorithms for computing a Shapley value-based network centrality. Suri
and Narahari [48] use the Shapley value to select the top k nodes in a social network.
Finally, there exists a rich body of literature investigating the small world phenomenon
and the properties of the networks in which it occurs. We mention the seminal work of






Matchings are an important theoretical abstraction which have been extensively studied
in several fields, including economics, combinatorial optimization, and computer science.
Matchings are often used to model markets, and examples include the classical marriage
problem, firms and workers, schools and students, hospitals and medical interns [13]. Pre-
vious matching literature focused primarily on one-to-one and one-to-many models [42].
More recently, however, attention has been paid to more complex models of many-to-many
matchings due to their relevance to many real-world markets. For example, most labour
markets involve at least a few many-to-many contracts [18]. One of the central questions in
matching games is stability. There exists a rich literature on the stability of matchings [42]
which dates back to the classical stable marriage problem [21].
More realistic matching models should take into account the fact that in many settings
the utility of a player is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that
other players make. Such an influence is called an externality. For instance, companies
care not only about the employers they hire themselves, but also about the employers
hired by other companies. This aspect is crucial to how competitive a company is on the
market, and so externalities must be considered to completely understand such situations.
Modeling matchings with externalities is computationally challenging, as fully expressive
representations require exponential space.
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Our contributions can be summarized as follows. We formulate the first compact model
of externalities in the computer science literature, in which the influence of a match on
each player is computed additively. Additive functions are a natural tradeoff between
expressivity and computational attractiveness, and have been used in many other domains,
such as additive hedonic games [8]. This enables computationally bounded players to
reason about the dynamics of the game. Second, we formulate a general stability concept,
in which a potentially deviating group evaluates the reaction of the outside players before
deciding whether to deviate or not. Then we consider several solution concepts that fall
under this general notion of stability, namely the neutral, optimistic, pessimistic, and
contractual setwise-stable sets. We study the properties of these stable sets and show
how they are related to each other, analyze their complexity and provide polynomial-time
algorithms where applicable. Finally we discuss social welfare and some natural examples
of matchings that can be expressed in our model.
3.2 Background
Perhaps the best known instance of a matching problem is the classical stable marriage
problem, which is commonly stated as follows [42]:
[The Stable Marriage Problem]:
Let M and W be two disjoint and equally sized sets of men and women, such that each
person has a strict ordering over the members of the opposite sex. The problem is to marry
the men and the women such that no two people of the opposite sex prefer each other to
their current partners. If no such pair exists, the marriages are considered to be stable.
The preference lists may be such that one would prefer to remain single, rather than
being married with someone they don’t care for. The following instance is an example of
the stable marriage problem.
Example 1. Let M = {m1,m2,m3} and W = {w1, w2, w3}, such that the men’s preference
lists are:
• P (m1) = (w2, w1, w3)
• P (m2) = (w1, w3, w2)
• P (m3) = (w1, w2, w3)
The women’s preference lists are:
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• P (w1) = (m1,m3,m2)
• P (w2) = (m3,m1,m2)
• P (w3) = (m1,m3,m2)
The matching given by µ = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)} is unstable, because pair (m1, w2)
is blocking. However, there exists a stable matching, namely µ
′
= {(m1, w1), (m3, w2),
(m2, w3)}.
The problem always admits a stable set of marriages [21]. We briefly describe the
Gale-Shapley algorithm, which returns such a stable solution in polynomial time.
[The Gale-Shapley Algorithm]:
Let every man propose to his favourite woman. Each woman who receives more than
one proposal rejects all, except for her favourite, among those men who proposed to her.
However, the woman does not accept the man yet, but rather keeps him on a “maybe” list,
to account for the possiblity that someone better may come later. In the second stage, the
men who were rejected proceed to propose to their second choices. Each woman receiving
proposals chooses her favourite among the new proposers and the maybe man from the
previous iteration. She rejects everyone, except for her favourite, among those who proposed
to her, which is marked as the new ”maybe”. The men who were rejected in the second
stage proceed to the next stages, up to at most n stages, where n is the number of men and
women, respectively. In the end, every woman is married to her favourite man, among
those who proposed to her, and the set of marriages formed can be shown to be stable.
Matching problems have been studied in depth since the introduction of the stable mar-
riage problem. The marriage problem is also known as a one-to-one matching. However,
there exist many realistic scenarios in which one-to-one matchings are not an appropriate
modeling tool. For example, assigning students to colleges, medical interns to hospitals,
and workers to companies, are examples of many-to-one matchings. The many-to-one
matching problem is also known as the stable admission model, or the hospital/residents
problem. In this case, every student has preferences over universities, and every univer-
sity has preferences over the subsets of students. A many-to-one matching of students to
universities is stable if there is no pair (u, a) consisting of a university u and a student
a, such that student a would prefer university u to their current one, and university u
would prefer to enroll student a, possibly after letting go of some of its current students.
The many-to-one matching problem can be solved efficiently using a generalization of the
Gale-Shapley algorithm.
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Finally, consider a set of consultants and companies, such that every company wants
to hire several consultants, and a consultant can work for more than one company. This
is an example of a many-to-many matching problem. Most job markets are known to
contain at least a few many-to-many contracts [18]. Many-to-many matchings are the
least understood class of matching problems and will be studied in more detail in this
thesis.
Here we consider a generalization of matching problems, in which players are affected
not only by the choices that they make themselves, but also by the choices that other
players make. Such influences, called externalities, are well studied in economics. In the
most general representation of matchings with externalities, players have preferences over
the set of all the possible matchings. While such a representation is complete, it requires
the players to store an exponential number of preference profiles. Next we formulate a
representation which is polynomial in the number of players and study its properties.
3.3 The Model
We start with the following definition:
Definition 20 (Matching Game). A matching game is represented as a tuple G = (M,W,Π),
where
• (M,W ) is a bipartite graph, where N = M∪W is the set of players, M = {m1, . . . ,m|M |}
and W = {w1, . . . , w|W |} are disjoint and on opposite sides of the bipartite graph.
• Π is a real valued function such that Π(m,w|m) is the value that player m receives
from forming an edge with player w, Π(m,w|w) is the value that w receives from
forming an edge with player m, and Π(m,w|z), where z 6∈ {m,w} is the externality
that player z receives when m and w form the edge (m,w).
We denote by a match (m,w) the formation of the edge between players m and w, and
by a matching a set of matches. We assume the formation of a match requires the consent
of both parties, while severing a match can be done unilaterally by any of its endpoints.
The “empty matching” contains no matches, while the “complete matching” contains all
the possible matches.






That is, a player’s utility is the sum of values it receives from matches it participates
in, along with the sum of all externalities that arise due to the matchings of other players.
When referring to some matching A, we write (m,w) to denote the existence of a match
between players m and w, and by (z) to denote that player z is not involved in any matches.
Example 2. Let M = {m},W = {w1, w2}, and Π given as follows:
• Π(m,w1|w1) = Π(m,w1|m) = 2
• Π(m,w2|w2) = 1
• Π(m,w2|m) = 5
• Π(m,w1|w2) = −1
• Π(m,w2|w1) = 3
Matching A = {(m,w1)}, {w2}) matches m with w1, giving the players utilities:
• u(m,A) = Π(m,w1|m) = 2
• u(w1, A) = Π(m,w1|w1) = 2
• u(w2, A) = Π(m,w1|w2) = −1
Similarly, matching A
′
= {(m,w1), (m,w2)} gives the players utilities:
• u(m,A′) = Π(m,w1|m) + Π(m,w2|m) = 7
• u(w1, A
′
) = Π(m,w1|w1) + Π(m,w2|w1) = 5
• u(w2, A
′
) = Π(m,w1, w2) + Π(m,w2|w2) = 0
3.4 Gamma-Stability
In this section we define a very general notion of stability, namely Γ-stability, in which
a deviating group evaluates the reaction of the players outside the group when deciding
whether to engage in the deviation or not. We first introduce some preliminary notions.
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Definition 22 (Deviation). Given a matching A and a set of players B ⊆ N , a deviation
of B from A is a new matching, A
′
, which is identical to A, except that each player in B
performs at least one of the following: severs a match with another player in N or forms
a new match with a player in B .
In other words, for every (m,w) ∈ A, if m ∈ B or w ∈ B, then (m,w) may or may not
exist in A
′
, while if m,w ∈ N \ B, then (m,w) is always in A′ . Furthermore, for every
(m,w) 6∈ A, (m,w) may be in A′ only when m,w ∈ B.
If group B can deviate and improve the utility of at least one of its members, without
degrading any other member, then B is called a blocking coalition. It is important to note
that for a coalition to be deviating, we require that all of its members perform some action,
either in the form of severing edges or in forming new matches. We contrast this with the
following possibility:
• There exists a set of players, B, that can perform a deviation as described above,
such that each player in B forms a new match or severs an old match.
• There exists player z 6∈ B that performs no action, but improves upon B’s deviation.
In this analysis, we say that coalition B is deviating. However, coalition B ∪ {z} is not
deviating, since z performs no action. A consequence of this requirement is that for B to
be a blocking coalition, all of its members must perform some action.
Definition 23 (Γ-response). Let Γ be a function such that for every set of players B ⊆ N
and matching A, the Γ-response Γ(B,A,A
′




Thus the Γ-response represents the reaction of the rest of the society upon the deviation
of a group.
Definition 24 (Γ-Stability). Matching A is Γ-stable if there exists no set of players B ⊆ N
that can deviate to a different matching A
′
, and improve the utility of at least one member
of B while not degrading the other members of B in the Γ-response Γ(B,A,A
′
).




In addition, we differentiate between weak stability, in which all the members of a
blocking coalition must improve strictly with the deviation, and strong stability, in which
at least one member must improve while the others do not degrade.
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The solution concepts discussed in this paper refer to strong stability, with the only
exception of the pairwise stable set, for which we require strict improvements for all the
deviators, as is done in the classical model of one-to-one matchings.
The Γ function may be hard to compute, and since the players are limited by bounded
rationality [43], they may be unable to engage in very complex computations to determine
the Γ-response. Thus in this paper, we will consider several natural heuristics that a
deviating group can use to evaluate the consequences of a possible deviation. We note
that the recursive core of Koczy [32] for games in partition function form can be seen as
an approximation of the Γ-response. There, the response Γ(B,A,A
′
) to a deviation A
′
by
coalition B contains the set of all equilibria in the residual game restricted to the players
in N \B, if any. If the residual game has no stable structure, then Γ(B,A,A′) contains all
the possible partitions in the residual. Next we define some weaker notions of stability.
Definition 25 (Γ-Individual Rationality). Matching A is Γ-individually rational if it has
no blocking coalition of size one.
Thus under Γ-individual rationality, no single player can improve by severing matches,
knowing that the reaction of the rest of the players upon their deviation is given by the
function Γ.
Lemma 5. The empty matching satisfies Γ-individual rationality for all functions Γ.
Definition 26 (Γ-Pairwise Stability). Matching A is Γ-pairwise stable if it has no blocking
coalitions of size one or two.
That is, A satisfies Γ-individual rationality and has no blocking pairs under the Γ
notion of stability. It is immediate that if a matching A satisfies Γ-stability, it also satisfies
Γ-pairwise rationality, and if A satisfies Γ-pairwise rationality, it also satisfies Γ-individual
rationality.
We also introduce a notion of fairness, that stipulates a minimal acceptable level of
utility. First observe that a utility of zero is achievable by all the players in the empty
matching. Thus a matching giving non-negative utility to all the players conveys the idea
that nobody is hurt in that matching. We emphasize that fairness can be achieved in any
game.
Definition 27 (Fairness). A matching is fair if it gives non-negative utility to every player.
In matching games without externalities, fairness is equivalent to Γ-individual rational-
ity. A player would never accept negative utility, since they can always get zero by severing
their matches.
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Fairness and individual rationality do not coincide in the presence of externalities.
There may exist individually rational matchings with negative utilities, since a player can
be hurt by matches they have no control over. Moreover, there can exist fair matchings
which are not individually rational, where a player may increase utility by severing some
negative matches.
In the next two sections we analyze the stability of many-to-many and one-to-one
matchings using several notions of stability that fall under the Γ-stability template, where
the players compute approximations of the Γ-response upon their deviation using neutral,
pessimistic, and optimistic reasoning.
3.5 Many-to-Many Matchings
Many-to-many matchings are the most general, yet the least understood class of matching
problems. In many-to-many matchings, each player can maintain contracts with arbitrarily
many players from the other side of the market.
3.5.1 Neutral Stability
The setwise-stable set is a solution concept which models interactions between groups of
players and has been introduced by Sotomayor [46].
Definition 28 (Setwise-Stable Set). Matching A is setwise-stable if no coalition B can
block assuming that N \ B will not react to their deviation. The setwise-stable set is the
set of all such matchings.
The setwise-stable set falls under the Γ notion of stability, where Γ is the identity




, for all B ⊂ N and all matchings A,A′ . Thus from
the point of view of a deviating group, the deviation has no consequences. The rest of
the society will be organized exactly the same way, and the deviators are allowed to keep
any matches with the outside players whenever they wish to do so. Because this solution
concept assumes the outside players do not respond to the deviation, we also refer to it
as the neutral setwise-stable set, to differentiate it from other variants we studied. The
matchings that belong to the setwise stable set can be characterized as follows:
Theorem 12. Any matching in the setwise-stable set of a game has the form:
A = {(m,w)|Π(m,w|m) ≥ 0 and Π(m,w|w) ≥ 0}
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Proof. Let A be a stable matching and (m,w) a match in G. If Π(m,w|m) < 0, then
(m,w) cannot belong to A, since m will sever the match and improve their utility by
doing so. The same reasoning applies for the case where Π(m,w|w) < 0. Thus any match
(m,w) ∈ A satisfies Π(m,w|m) ≥ 0 and Π(m,w|w) ≥ 0.
Note that the setwise-stable set can be empty as we will show in the following example.
Example 3 (Empty Setwise-Stable Set). Let M = {m}, W = {w1, w2}, with Π given as
follows:
• Π(m,wi|m) = 0
• Π(m,wi|wi) = ε
• Π(m,w1|w2) = Π(m,w2|w1) = −∆, where ∆ > ε > 0
The empty matching is blocked by (m,w1), matching {(m,w1), (w2)} is blocked by (m,w2),
matching {(m,w2), (w1)} is blocked by (m,w1), and the complete matching {(m,w1), (m,w2)}
is blocked by the empty matching.
Theorem 13. Any matching in the neutral setwise-stable set is fair under positive exter-
nalities.
Proof. Let A be a matching in the neutral setwise-stable set and z ∈ N any player.
Matching A satisfies individual rationality, thus the sum of values that z receives in A
must be positive, since otherwise z could improve utility by cutting all its matches. The








Proposition 1. The complete matching is setwise-stable under positive values and positive
externalities.
Proposition 2. The empty matching is setwise-stable under negative values and negative
externalities.
Theorem 14. The unique candidate for the setwise-stable set under positive values and
negative externalities is the complete matching.
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Proof. Let A be an incomplete matching and m,w two players that do not form a match
in A. Since Π(m,w|m) > 0 and Π(m,w|w) > 0, the pair {m,w} can deviate by forming
the match (m,w). Both players are allowed to keep all their other matches in A, and so
their utility strictly increases after the deviation. Thus no incomplete matching can be
setwise-stable.
For example, if the externalities are drawn from (−ε, 0), where ε is small compared to
the values, the complete matching is setwise-stable. If the externality values are −∞, the
empty matching is blocking for the complete matching, case in which the setwise-stable
set is empty.
Theorem 15. The unique candidate for the setwise stable set with negative values and
positive externalities is the empty matching.
Proof. Any non-empty matching will contain some match (m,w) which is negative for m
and w. These players will have an incentive to cut (m,w) since they can improve their
utility by doing so. Thus the empty matching is the only candidate for the setwise stable
set.
The following game contrasts the case where the empty matching belongs to the setwise-
stable set with the case where it does not.
Example 4. Let G = (M,W,Π) be such that Π(m,w|m) = Π(m,w|w) = −ε < 0, for all
m,w and Π(m,w|z) = δ > 0 for all m,w and z 6= m,w. If ε  δ, the only matching
satisfying setwise stability is the empty matching, since the formation of any match is very
expensive for the participating players and not compensated by the utility obtained from
the externalities. Otherwise, if δ  ε, the complete matching is blocking for the empty
matching, and so the setwise-stable set is empty.
To prove the next hardness result regarding the complexity of computing setwise-stable
matchings, we provide a reduction from the KNAPSACK problem [22].
KNAPSACK
Input : Tuple I = 〈U, s, v, B,K〉, where U = {u1, . . . , un} is a finite set, s(u) ∈ Z+ the size
of element u ∈ U , v(u) ∈ Z+ the value of element u ∈ U , B ∈ Z+ a size constraint,
and K ∈ Z+ a value goal.
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Question : Does there exist a subset U
′ ⊆ U such that∑
u∈U ′
s(u) ≤ B and
∑
u∈U ′
v(u) ≥ K? (3.1)
Theorem 16. Checking nonemptiness of the setwise-stable set is NP-hard.
Proof. We provide a reduction from KNAPSACK. Given instance I = 〈U, s, v, B,K〉, we
construct a matching game G such that G has a nonempty setwise-stable set if and only
if I has a solution. Let M = {x1, . . . , xn,m1,m2}, W = {y1, . . . , yn, w}, and Π have the
following non-zero entries:
• Π(xi, yi|m1) = −s(ui) and Π(xi, yi|m2) = v(ui), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
• Π(m1, w|m1) = −B
• Π(m2, w|m2) = K −
∑
ui∈U v(ui)
• Π(xj, w|xj) = −1 and Π(mi, yj|yj) = −1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2} and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Since the instances with
∑
ui∈U v(ui) < K are trivially solvable, we are interested in those
cases where
∑
ui∈U v(ui) ≥ K, and so Π(m2, w|m2) ≤ 0. If the KNAPSACK instance I
has a solution U
′





 ∪ {(m1), (m2), (w)} (3.2)
First note that U
′
satisfies the conditions in (3.1), and so the utilities of the players in A
are:
• u(m1, A) =
∑
ui∈U ′ Π(xi, yi|m1) =
∑
ui∈U ′ −s(ui) ≥ −B
• u(m2, A) =
∑
ui∈U ′ Π(xi, yi|m2) =
∑
ui∈U ′ v(ui) ≥ K
• u(xi, A) = u(yi, A) = u(w,A) = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
All the players, except possibly for m1 and m2, obtain their best possible utility in A.
Thus any blocking coalition, B, would have to contain at least one of m1 and m2. Since
blocking requires each member of B to perform an action, it follows that m1, m2 can only
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be involved in blocking A by forming a new match. Recall that Π(mi, yj|yj) = −1, and so
players yj will never accept a match with either m1 or m2. Thus the only matches that m1
and m2 could form, if deviating, are (m1, w) and (m2, w), respectively.
The best utility that m1 can get when matched with w is attained in A
∗
1 = {(m1, w),
(x1), . . ., (xn), (y1), . . ., (yn), (m2)}, where the candidate for the blocking coalition is







1) = Π(m1, w|m1) = −B ≤
∑
ui∈U ′ −s(ui) = u(m1, A)
The best utility that m2 can get when matched with w is attained in A
∗
2 = {(m2, w),
(x1, y1), . . ., (xn, yn), (m1)}, where the candidate for the blocking coalition is B2 =
{m2, w} ∪
(⋃






















v(ui) = u(m2, A)
Thus m1 and m2 cannot improve by deviating from A. Since the other players have no
incentive to deviate, it follows that A belongs to the setwise-stable set.
Conversely, if the setwise-stable set of G is non-empty, let A be a stable matching.
First note that A must satisfy neutral individual rationality, and so it cannot contain any
match with negative value for one of the endpoints. Thus the only non-zero matches that




. In addition, any matches of the
form (xi, yj), with i 6= j, can be removed from A without losing stability. Thus without
loss of generality, A can be written as a union of the matching in Equation 3.2 for some
subset U
′ ⊆ U . From A stable, coalitions {(m1, w)} and {(m2, w)} are not blocking, thus
Inequalities 3.3 and 3.3 hold. Equivalently, the conditions in (3.1) are satisfied, and so U
′
is a solution for the KNAPSACK instance.
Theorem 17. Checking setwise-stable set membership is coNP-complete.
Proof. We show that the complementary problem, of deciding whether a matching does
not belong to the setwise-stable set of a game, is NP -complete. Given matching A, one
can nondeterministically guess pair 〈B,AB〉 such that matching A is blocked by coalition
B through matching AB. Verifying that 〈B,AB〉 is blocking for A can be done in O(n3),
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by computing for each member z of B, the utility in A and in AB (assuming that N \ B
does not react to the deviation). To prove NP -hardness, we provide a reduction from
KNAPSACK. Given instance I = 〈U, s, v, B,K〉, let G = (M,W,Π) be a matching game
with M = {x1, . . . , xn,m1,m2}, W = {y1, . . . , yn, w1, w2}, and Π with non-zero entries:
• Π(xi, yi|m1) = −s(ui) and Π(xi, yi|w1) = v(ui), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
• Π(m2, w2|m1) = −B − ε and Π(m2, w2|w1) = K − ε, for some 0 < ε < 1
• Π(m1, w|w) = Π(m,w1|m) = −1, for all w ∈ W \ {w1} and m ∈M \ {m1}
Let matching A = {(m2, w2), (m1), (w1), (x1), . . . , (xn), (y1), . . . , (yn)}. The utilities of the
players are:
• u(xi, A) = Π(m2, w2|xi) = 0 and u(yi, A) = Π(m2, w2|yi) = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
• u(m1, A) = Π(m2, w2|m1) = −B − ε
• u(w1, A) = Π(m2, w2|w1) = K − ε
• u(m2, A) = Π(m2, w2|m2) = 0 and u(w2, A) = Π(m2, w2|w2) = 0
All the players, except for m1 and w1 obtain their maximum utility in A. In addition, m1
or w1 can only block by forming the match (m1, w1), since all other matches with one of
these players as an endpoint are unfeasible. We claim that I has a solution if and only if
A has a blocking coalition. If I has a solution U









{(xi, yi+1), (xi+1, yi)}
 ∪ {(m1, w1), (m2), (w2)},
where xn+1 = x1 and yn+1 = y1. The utilities of the players in AB are:
• u(xi, AB) = 0 and u(yi, AB) = 0, ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , n}
• u(m1, AB) = −
∑
ui∈U ′ s(ui) ≥ −B > −B − ε = u(m1, A)
• u(w1, AB) =
∑
ui∈U ′ v(ui) ≥ K > K − ε = u(w1, A)
• u(m2, AB) = u(w2, AB) = 0
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Thus the grand coalition is blocking under neutrality, since it can form matching AB and
(weakly) improve the utilities of all its members by doing so.
Conversely, assume that A is blocked by a coalition B through some matching AB.
Note that all the players, except for m1 and w1, obtain their maximum possible utility in
A. Player m1 cannot block without player w1, since all other matches (m1, w), for w 6= w1
are unfeasible; similarly for w1. Thus any blocking coalition must include players m1, w1
and match (m1, w1). In addition, for at least one of m1, w1 to strictly improve after the
















v(ui) ≥ u(w1A) = K − ε (3.4)








= {ui ∈ U | (xi, yi) ∈ AB} is a solution for the I instance.
3.5.2 Optimistic Stability
Optimistic stability is another instantiation of Γ-stability, in which a blocking coalition
hopes that the rest of the players will do the best for the deviators. Optimism has been
considered before in game theoretic models [32].
Definition 29 (Optimistic Setwise-Stable Set). A matching A belongs to the optimistic
setwise-stable set if there is no coalition B that can block under the assumption that the
players in N \B react in the best possibly way for B.
In our model, optimism translates to the following. When coalition B considers devia-
tion A
′
from A, every player z ∈ B evaluates the deviation assuming the players in N \B
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will organize themselves in the best possible way for z. That is, z hopes that N \ B will
cut any matches with a negative influence on z and form all the matches with a positive
influence on z, including initiating those with z as an endpoint (which z would accept).
According to z’s evaluation, this leads to matching A
′′
z . If z improves (or does not degrade)
in A
′′
z compared to A, then z agrees to participate in blocking.
Observe that since the Π function is asymmetric, it may be the case that the members
of a blocking coalition B have inconsistent wishes. That is, a match (m,w) ∈ N \ B that
is positive for a player z1 ∈ B may be negative for another player z2 ∈ B. Agent z1 will
hope that N \B keeps (m,w), while player z2 hopes the same match will be cut.
Optimism can be attributed to bounded rationality and incomplete knowledge. In our
model, a player is aware of the influence of every match on their utility. However, the same
player might not keep track of the influence of all the matches over all the players, and
thus would not be able to compute every utility upon the deviation. Moreover, even if the
players are aware of the entire Π function, they do not engage in sophisticated reasoning
about the feasibility of possible reactions. Instead, every player computes their own version
of Γ, and uses that to decide whether to participate in the deviation.
Under optimism, any player not receiving their maximum utility can randomly sever a
match to destabilize the matching, hoping they will get the best possible as a result of this
destabilization.














) is the empty matching.
Proof. Let A be a matching in the optimistic setwise-stable set and z a player. Since A
is stable, z is not blocking. Thus it must be that z is either unmatched, case in which he
cannot deviate, or z is matched but already obtains the highest possible utility, and so has
no incentive to deviate. Thus N can be partitioned in two subsets, N
′
, the players that
obtain in A their maximal utility, and N
′′
, the unmatched players.
While it may appear that optimistic players will never accept the formation of negative
edges in equilibrium, the following example shows that this is not necessarily the case.
Example 5. Let (M,W,Π) be a game such that M = {m1,m2}, W = {w1, w2}, and Π as
follows:
• Player m1: Π(m1, w1|m1) = 1, Π(m1, w2|m1) = 1
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• Player m2: Π(m2, w2|m2) = 1
• Player w1: Π(m2, w2|w1) = −W , Π(m1, w2|w1) = 1, and Π(m1, w1|w1) = Π(m2, w1|
w1) = −2W , where W  1
• Player w2: Π(m2, w2|w2) = 1
The unique matching that belongs to the optimistic setwise-stable set is A = {(m1, w2),
(m2, w2), (w1)}, which gives player w1 utility u(w1, A) = Π(m1, w2|w1) + Π(m2, w2|w1) =
1−W . Player w1 attains their best possible utility in matching A
′
= {(m1, w2), (m2), (m2)},
with u(w1, A
′
) = Π(m1, w2|w1) = 1  1− 2W . Any matching other than A can be blocked
by coalition {m1,m2, w2}, since all these players obtain their maximum utility in A. In
addition, w1 cannot sever any matches in A due to being a singleton, and also cannot block
by forming new matches, because those edges would decrease w1’s utility even further.
Theorem 19. Checking nonemptiness of the optimistic setwise-stable set is NP-complete.
Proof. First note that checking nonemptiness of the optimistic setwise-stable set is in NP.
Given a matching A, the utility of each player z ∈ N in A can be computed in O(n2). In
addition, for every pair (m,w) ∈ (M,W ), we can again compute in O(n2) the best case
utilities of m and w when matched with each other. Verifying if A is stable can be done by
iterating over all pairs (m,w) and checking in O(1) if both m and w can (weakly) improve
by deviating under optimism, compared to their current utility in A. The reduction is
similar to that in Theorem 16.
Next we consider the problem of computing the optimistic setwise-stable set from the
perspective of parametrized complexity. A problem is fixed parameter tractable (FPT)
with respect to some parameter if there exists an algorithm which given an instance of size
n and parameter value k, computes a solution in O(f(k)nO(1)), where f is a computable
function.
Given a matching game G = (M,W,Π), classify the set of possible matches, M ×W ,
into the following categories:
• Required: R = {(m,w) : Π(m,w|m) ≥ 0,Π(m,w|w) ≥ 0, and Π(m,w|m) +
Π(m,w|w) > 0}
• Feasible Positive: FP = {(m,w) : Π(m,w|m) = Π(m,w|w) = 0 and Π(m,w|z) ≥
0,∀z 6= m,w}
44
• Feasible Negative: FN = {(m,w) : Π(m,w|m) = Π(m,w|w) = 0 and Π(m,w|z) ≤
0,∀z 6= m,w and the inequality is strict for at least one z}
• Feasible Controversial: FC = {(m,w) : Π(m,w|m) = Π(m,w|w) = 0 and there exist
z1 6= z2 such that Π(m,w|z1) > 0 and Π(m,w|z2) < 0}
• Forbidden: F = {(m,w) : Π(m,w|m) < 0 or Π(m,w|w) < 0}
Any matching, A, belonging to the setwise-stable set must include all the required matches,
since the endpoints of such a match will block otherwise, and cannot contain any forbidden
matches, which would be severed by at least one of the endpoints. In addition, matching
A1 = A ∪ FP is stable, since it does not degrade any player and possibly improves the
utility of some players. Similarly, matching A2 = A ∪ FP \ FN is also stable. Thus,
if the optimistic setwise-stable set is non-empty, it must contain a matching that has all
the matches in FP , but none of FN . Thus the only difficulty lies in choosing a subset
of the feasible controversial edges. By parameterizing the number of such edges, we can
obtain an FPT algorithm for determining non-emptiness of the optimistic setwise-stable
set (Algorithm 3.5.2).
Algorithm 3 FPT: Optimistic Setwise-Stable Matching
1: A← ∅;
2: for all (m,w) ∈ (M,W ) do
3: // Include (m,w) if required or feasible positive;
4: if (m,w) ∈ R or (m,w) ∈ FP then
5: A← A ∪ {(m,w)};
6: end if
7: end for
8: // Check all possible combinations of feasible controversial matches (FC);
9: for all FC
′ ⊆ FC do
10: A∗ ← A ∪ FC ′ ;




15: // The optimistic setwise-stable set is empty ;
16: return NULL;
Theorem 20. Checking non-emptiness of the optimistic setwise-stable set is FPT with
respect to the number of feasible controversial matches.
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Proof. Let k be the number of feasible controversial matches. From previous observations,
if the optimistic setwise-stable set is non-empty, it must contain a matching A, such that
R ⊆ A, FP ⊆ A, A ∩ FN = ∅, and A ∩ F = ∅. Matching A may contain some feasible
controversial matches, and Algorithm 3.5.2 checks all the possible subsets of FC. Thus if
a stable matching exists, the algorithm will find it. The algorithm must be preceded by a
pre-processing step that computes, for every pair (m,w), the best case utilities of players
m, w if they are matched with each other. The pre-processing step can be completed in
O(n4), checking the stability of a matching in O(n3), and so the runtime of Algorithm 3.5.2
is O(n4 + 2kn3).
The following two theorems consider the case where externalities are positive, and
negative, respectively.
Theorem 21. The unique candidate for the optimistic setwise-stable set under negative
externalities is the empty matching.
Proof. Let A be a non-empty matching satisfying optimistic setwise stability, (m,w) an
edge in A, ands z a player. Since (m,w) has negative externalities, Π(m,w|z) < 0, and so
z’s utility in A is suboptimal. Thus z will attempt to disrupt A by severing some of his
matches and hoping that in response, N \ {z} will organize themselves in the best possible
way for z. The only case in which z cannot deviate is when z is unmatched. This holds
for every z ∈ N , and so A must be the empty matching.
Theorem 22. The only candidates for the optimistic setwise-stable set under positive
externalities are the complete and the empty matchings.
Proof. If Π(m,w|m) ≥ 0 and Π(m,w|w) ≥ 0 for all m,w, the complete matching is the
only setwise-stable matching. Otherwise, assume Π(m,w|m) < 0 for some m,w, and let
A be an optimistic setwise-stable matching. Any player z 6= m,w satisfies Π(m,w|z) > 0.
Thus z receives suboptimal utility in A in the absence of (m,w), and so z will block hoping
the deviation will result in the formation of this match. Since A is stable, z is not deviating,
hence it must be that z is unable to deviate, i.e. z is unmatched. Agent z was arbitrarily
chosen from N \ {m,w}, thus A is the empty matching.
We note that many alternative definitions of optimism are possible. A natural and less
extreme version of optimistic reasoning is for the players to not assume that others will
initiate matches with them upon a deviation. In this case, any benefit from a deviation
can only come from the removal of negative matches, or from a change in externalities.
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3.5.3 Pessimistic Stability
Definition 30 (Pessimistic Setwise-Stable Set). A matching A belongs to the pessimistic
setwise-stable set if there is no coalition B that can block under the assumption that N \B
reacts in the worst possible way for B.
The idea underlying pessimism is that the society punishes deviating behaviour max-
imally. Similarly to the optimistic case, every player z in a blocking coalition B assumes
that N \ B will organize themselves in the worst possible way for z. Again, there may
be inconsistencies among the reactions that the members of B expect from N \ B, and
thus the worst possible outcome may not happen for each member of B. Under pessimism,
the players are willing to accept many more outcomes compared to the neutral or op-
timistic setwise-stable sets, since they are convinced the deviation can trigger the worst
possible outcome for them. However, the pessimistic setwise-stable set can still be empty,
as Example 3 illustrates.
Theorem 23. Any fair matching satisfies pessimistic individual rationality.
Proof. If a player z with u(z) > 0 deviates, the set N \ {z} can always form the empty
matching, which would decrease z’s utility to zero.
Thus every fair matching is a candidate for the pessimistic setwise stable set. Under
positive externalities, the following stronger condition holds.
Theorem 24. Any matching satisfying pessimistic setwise-stability under positive exter-
nalities is fair.
Proof. Let A be a matching in the pessimistic setwise-stable set and assume there exists
player z with negative utility in A. Agent z cannot be unmatched, since all the unmatched
players receive non-negative utility. Thus z is matched and can deviate by cutting all his
matches. The worst matching that N \ {z} can form is the empty matching. Thus, by
deviating, z would receive a worst case utility of zero, which is better than his current
utility in A. Since A is stable, z cannot exist.
In general, a deviating coalition B will assume that N \B forms the complete matching
under negative externalities, and the empty matching under positive externalities.
Example 6. Let M = {m1,m2},W = {w1, w2} with Π(mi, wi|mi) = Π(mi, wi|wi) =
ε,Π(mi, wi|mj) = Π(mi, wi|wj) = −∆, where i 6= j and ∆  ε > 0. The pessimistic
setwise-stable set is the empty matching, while no matching satisfies neutral setwise-stability.
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Unlike the neutral setwise-stable set, the pessimistic setwise-stable set of Example 4
is nonempty when δ  ε. However, the pessimistic setwise-stable set can still be empty.
The following example is based on the reduction in Theorem 16 and contains an unfeasible
knapsack instance, with U = {u1, u2}, s(u1) = 3, s(u2) = 5, v(u1) = 2, v(u2) = 10, B = 4,
and K = 5.
Example 7 (Empty Pessimistic Setwise-Stable Set). Let G = (M,W,Π) with M =
{x1, x2,m1,m2}, W = {y1, y2, w1, w2}, and Π(x1, y1|m1) = −3, Π(x2, y2|m1) = −5, Π(x1, y1
|m2) = 2, Π(x2, y2|m2) = 10, Π(m1, w1|m1) = −4, Π(m2, w2|m2) = −7, and Π(mi, yj|yj) =
−1, Π(xi, wj|xi) = −1, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}. If a matching does not contain edge (x2, y2),
then coalition {x1, y1, x2, y2,m2, w2} can block by ensuring that matches {(x1, y1), (x2, y2),
(m2, w2)} are formed (possibly in addition to others). This would give player m2 a util-
ity of 5, which is strictly better than the maximum obtained by m2 in the absence of
match (x2, y2). On the other hand, if a matching does contain edge (x2, y2), then coali-
tion {x1, y1, x2, y2,m1, w1} can block by forming (m1, w1) and ensuring that none of the
matches (x1, y1), (x2, y2) occur. This deviation would give player m1 a utility of −4, which
is strictly better than the maximum obtained in the presence of match (x2, y2).
Next we consider the complexity of computing matchings in the pessimistic setwise-
stable set.
Theorem 25. Checking pessimistic setwise-stable set membership is coNP-complete.
Proof. The reduction from Theorem 17 applies, by noting that in matching A of Theo-
rem 17, a coalition is blocking under neutral reasoning if and only if it is blocking under
pessimistic reasoning.
Theorem 26. Checking nonemptiness of the pessimistic setwise-stable set is NP-hard.
Proof. The same reduction as in Theorem 16 applies, by noting that a coalition is blocking
for the constructed matching under pessimistic reasoning if and only if it is blocking under
neutral reasoning.
Our results with respect to the complexity of many-to-many matchings are summarized
in Table 3.5.3.
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Table 3.1: Setwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matchings with Externalities
Setwise-Stable Set Optimistic Neutral Pessimistic
Membership P coNP -complete coNP -complete
Nonemptiness NP -complete NP -hard NP -hard
3.5.4 Contractual Stability
From previous sections, the optimistic setwise-stable sets can often be characterized by
extreme outcomes, such as the empty and complete matchings. These outcomes arise under
optimistic reasoning because of the excessive expectations of the players, who refuse to
settle for anything less than the best. The neutral setwise-stable set is still too permissive:
a player never accepts to maintain a negative match, even when that match indirectly
helps them obtain a very high utility (Example 4). On the other hand, under pessimistic
reasoning, the players may accept inadequate matchings on the basis of them not being
the worst possible. In this section we strive for a more balanced stability concept, that is
not as permissive as the optimistic and neutral setwise-stable sets, yet not as negative as
the pessimistic set.
Definition 31 (Contractual Setwise-Stable Set). A matching A belongs to the contractual
setwise-stable set if there is no coalition B that can block under the assumption that
(i) the players from N \B which are hurt by the deviation maximally punish B.
(ii) the players which are not harmed by the deviation do not react.
Every player in B evaluates independently their punishment from N \B (if any), when
contemplating deviation A
′
from A. Denote by H the players that degrade in A
′
compared
to A, and by I the players in N \ B unharmed by A′ , where H ∪ I = N \ B. Then
every z in B assumes H will sever all the matches positive for z and will form all the
matches negative for z. The players in I do not react to the deviation, and so they are
not involved in the formation of new matches. However, I might also lose those matches
that H decides to sever when punishing z. This results in matching A
′′
z , which is the worst
possible punishment that H can give z without any help from I or B. If z is still better
off in A
′′
z compared to A, then z agrees to participate in blocking.
Recall that for δ  ε, the setwise-stable set of Example 4 is empty. However, the
contractual setwise-stable set consists of the complete matching, which is the outcome
that one would intuitively expect. Thus under contractual reasoning players may accept to
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maintain negative-valued matches as long as long as those matches are valued by everyone
else. Nevertheless, the contractual setwise-stable set can be empty (Example 3).
An Oceanic Game
In this section we consider an example where the contractual setwise-stable set is a natural
stability concept. Consider a type of oceanic game [37] where the players are divided into
two disjoint sets: big players and small players. The interaction between big players has a
big influence on everyone, while the interaction between small players has a small influence.
The interaction between a big player and a small player also has a small influence.
Definition 32 (Big-player small-player game). A big-player small-player game is defined
as a matching game (M,W ) such that B and S are disjoint sets of “big” players and
“small” players respectively, where B ∪ S = N . For the game to be nontrivial, we require
that there are big players and small players on both sides of the market. For each b, b
′ ∈ B,
Π(b, b
′ |z) ∈ {k∆ | k ∈ Z}, for all z ∈ N . For all other players x, y ∈ N such that at least
one of them is a small player, Π(x, y|z) ∈ {kε | k ∈ Z}, for all z ∈ N . In addition, the
matches involving two big players have a much bigger influence than any other matches.
Formally, we require that ∆ > n2ε.
Theorem 27. Let (M,W ) be a big-player small-player game. Then any matching that
satisfies weak contractual setwise-stability in the original game (M,W ) also satisfies weak
contractual setwise-stability in the game reduced to the set of big players, (M,W |B).
Proof. Let A be a matching in the contractual setwise-stable set of (M,W ) and AB the
same matching in the reduced game (M,W |B). Assume by contradiction that AB is
unstable and let D ⊆ B be a weakly blocking coalition, that can perform deviation D in
AB. From the Π function definition, it must be that each member of D improves with at
least ∆ as a result of D. Consider now the following deviation, D′ , that coalition D can
perform in A:
• Set the matches among D identically in D′ and D.
• Set the matches between D and D \B identically in D′ and D.
• Leave the matches between D and S the same as in A.
Observe that the deviators D are not removing any matches with the small players in
D′ . This ensures that the big players hurt by deviation D′ are the same as those hurt by
deviation D. However, it is possible that at least one of the following happens:
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(i) Some small players are hurt by deviation D′ .
(ii) Some deviators are hurt by maintaining the matches with the small players in D′ .
In each of the cases (i), (ii), the additional loss in utility that each d ∈ D incurs in D′
compared to D can only come from small edges, and so is bounded by n2ε. Since each
d ∈ D gained at least ∆ from D, it follows that each player d ∈ D gains at least ∆−n2ε > 0
by performing D′ . Thus D is a blocking coalition for A, contradiction with A being stable.
It follows that the assumption must have been false, and AB is stable.
3.5.5 Relation between the Sets
Given a matching game, let N -set(G) denote the neutral setwise-stable set, P-set(G) the
pessimistic setwise-stable set, O-set(G) the optimistic setwise-stable set, and C-set(G) the
contractual setwise-stable set.
Theorem 28. Given any matching game G, the following inclusions hold
O-set(G) ⊆ N -set(G) ⊆ C-set(G) ⊆ P-set(G)
Proof. Let B denote a potentially blocking coalition. If a matching belongs to the op-
timistic set, then B cannot hope to improve even when the rest of the players organize
themselves in the best possible way for B. Thus the optimistic set is included in all the
other stable sets. If a matching belongs to the pessimistic set, then B cannot improve
when the rest of the society will punish them maximally for the deviation. Under the
other stability concepts, B assumes a potentially better reaction from N \B. Thus if B’s
deviation is not profitable in the optimistic, neutral, or contractual scenarios, it is also not
profitable in the pessimistic scenario. Hence the pessimistic set contains all the other sets.
Finally, we show the neutral set is included in the contractual set. Let A ∈ N -set(G) be a
matching. Since A is setwise-stable, for every coalition B that contemplates deviation A
′
,
there exists a player z ∈ B that does not improve in A′ . Under contractual behaviour, the
same player z either does not improve, or can expect to be hurt by N \B’s reaction to A′ .
Thus if player z does not participate in blocking under neutral behaviour, z still does not
participate in blocking under contractual behaviour. Hence A ∈ C-set(G).
51
3.5.6 Social Welfare
Having discussed the issue of stability in many-to-many matching games, in the following
section we discuss the social welfare and how it can be maximized. The social welfare of a
matching A is defined as: SW (A) =
∑
z∈N u(z, A).
We call a matching optimal if it maximizes social welfare among all the possible match-
ings. Finding the optimal matching is an important question in combinatorial optimization.
The optimal one-to-one matching can be found in polynomial time using the Hungarian
algorithm [13]. In our model, the optimal matching can be determined greedily.
Theorem 29 (Optimal Matching). In many-to-many matching games with additive exter-
nalities, the optimal matching can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. For all (m,w) ∈ (M,W ), let φ(m,w) =
∑
z∈N Π(m,w|z). The value φ(m,w)
represents the influence of (m,w) on the welfare of any matching that includes it. Then the
optimal matching can be determined greedily, by taking all the matches with non-negative
influence on social welfare: AOPT = {(m,w)|φ(m,w) ≥ 0}
While the optimal matching is the best solution for the society overall, it is not neces-
sarily stable:
Example 8 (Unstable Optimal Matching). Let M = {m} and W = {w1, . . . , wt}. Define
Π(m,wi|m) = −ε and Π(m,wi|wi) = ∆, with ∆ > ε > 0. The complete matching, AOPT is
optimal. However, AOPT is not individually rational, since u(m,AOPT ) = −nε < 0. Agent
m can improve its utility to zero by severing all its matchings.
There exist, however, games where the optimal matching is stable. When the influence
of any edge (m,w) is always positive or always negative, that is Π(m,w|z) ≥ 0, for all
z ∈ N , or Π(m,w|z) ≤ 0 for all z ∈ N , the optimal matching satisfies all the stability
concepts discussed.
3.6 One-to-One Matchings
In this section we analyze compact externalities in the context of one-to-one matchings. In
addition, we analyze the version of Γ-pairwise stability in which a pair can deviate if and
only if both deviators improve strictly as a result of the deviation, which is consistent with
the original definition of the stable marriage problem. In general, the requirement that
the blocking coalition improves strictly with the deviation is known as weak stability, and
examples of such solution concepts include the weak core and the weak pairwise stable set.
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3.6.1 Pessimistic Stability
Definition 33 (Pessimistic Core). Matching A belongs to the pessimistic core if there is
no coalition B that can block under the assumption that N \B reacts in the worst possible
way for B.
The core is a solution concept very similar to the setwise-stable set and is commonly
used in one-to-one matchings. Unlike the setwise-stable set, the core does not allow devi-
ators to maintain matches with the non-deviators.
Theorem 30. Computing a maximal pessimistic pairwise stable maching is NP-hard.
Proof. Recall that finding a maximal pairwise stable outcome in the stable marriage prob-
lem with ties and incomplete lists (SMTI) is known to be NP-complete [38]. Any SMTI
instance can be expressed using the Π function, by setting all the externality influences to
zero, Π(m,w|m) = −∞, whenever player m prefers being alone to being matched with w,
and Π(m,w1|m) = Π(m,w2|m) whenever player m is indifferent between w1 and w2.
In addition, we consider a less extreme notion of pessimism. Namely, when Π is non-
negative, any matching containing singletons (unmatched players) can weakly improve
everyone’s utility by pairing the singletons with each other. Based on this observation, the
pessimistic deviators can have a less extreme attitude, and assume that while the rest of
the players may punish them for the deviation, they will not stay unmatched.
Definition 34 (Restricted Pessimistic Core). A matching A belongs to the restricted pes-
simistic core if there is no coalition B that can block under the assumption that N \ B
forms the worst possible matching for B, among all the matchings of size
min (|M ∩ (N \B) |, |W ∩ (N \B) |)
The restricted pessimistic core is only defined when Π ≥ 0.
Restricted pessimistic pairwise stability is defined similarly, by limiting to 2 the size of
the blocking coalition to at most two. Both the pessimistic and restricted pessimistic pair-
wise stable sets are always nonempty, and a stable solution can be computed in polynomial
time when Π ≥ 0 (Algorithm 3.6.1).
Theorem 31. A restricted pessimistic pairwise stable matching can be computed in O(n5)
when Π is non-negative.
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Proof. First note that the runtime of Algorithm 3.6.1 is O(n5). Let A be the matching
returned by Algorithm 3.6.1 and assume by contradiction that A is not stable under pes-
simistic pairwise stability. Then there exists deviating pair (m,w
′
), where the matches of
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However, matching A is stable under E−, and so for any (m,w
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(m), contradiction with (∗). Thus A must be stable.
Corollary 3. A pessimistic pairwise stable matching can be computed in O(n5) when Π is
non-negative.
Proof. When Π ≥ 0, the utility that pessimistic deviators expect upon a deviation is lower
than the utility expected by restricted pessimistic deviators. Since the matching returned
by Algorithm 3.6.1 is not blocked by restricted pessimistic deviators, it also cannot be
blocked by pessimistic deviators.
The matching returned by Algorithm 3.6.1 also satisfies pessimistic pairwise stability.
A pessimistic pairwise stable matching can be computed in O(n2) by using Algo-
rithm 3.6.1, which simply runs the Gale-Shapley algorithm by ignoring externalities. How-
ever, as the next example illustrates, the restricted pessimistic core can be empty.
Example 9. (Empty Restricted Pessimistic Core) Consider the game G = (M,W,Π), with
M = {m1,m2,m3}, W = {w1, w2, w3}, and Π defined as follows:
• For z1 ∈ {m1, w1}, let Π(m1, w1|z1) = Π(m2, w2|z1) = Π(m3, w2|z1) = 6, Π(m1, w3|z1)
= Π(m3, w1 | z1) = 7, Π(m1, w2|z1) = Π(m2, w1|z1) = Π(m3, w3|z1) = 9, and
Π(m2, w3|z1) = 0.
• For z2 ∈ {m2, w2}, let Π(mi, wi|z2) = 6, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Π(m1, w2|z2) = Π(m2, w1|z2)
= 7, Π(m2, w3|z2) = Π(m3, w2|z2) = 9, Π(m1, w3|z2) = Π(m3, w1| z2) = 0.
• For z3 ∈ {m3, w3}, let Π(mi, wi|z3) = 6, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Π(m2, w1|z3) = 0, Π(m1, w2|z3)
= 13, Π(m2, w3|z3) = Π(m3, w2|z3) = 7, and Π(m1, w3|z3) = Π(m3, w1) = 9.
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Algorithm 4 Restricted Pessimistic Pairwise Stability (Π ≥ 0)
1: for all z ∈ N do
2: // If z ∈M then P (z) = W , else P (z) = M ;
3: for all t ∈ P (z) do
4: M
′
= M \ {z, t};
5: W
′
= W \ {z, t};
6: for all (m,w) ∈ (M ′ ,W ′) do
7: ψ(m,w)← Π(m,w|z);
8: end for
9: // Compute A−, the worst case matching for z when paired with t;





11: E−z (t)← Π(z, t|z);
12: for all (m,w) ∈ A− do




17: // Return a stable matching according to preferences given by E−, with ties broken
arbitrarily;
18: A = Gale-Shapley(M,W,E−);
19: return A;
Algorithm 5 Pessimistic and Neutral Pairwise Stability (Π ≥ 0)
1: for all (m,w) ∈ (M,W ) do
2: Em(w) = Π(m,w|m);
3: end for
4: // Break ties in E arbitrarily;
5: A = Gale-Shapley(M,W,E);
6: return A;
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The possible matchings are:
• A1 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3)}
• A2 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w2)}
• A3 = {(m1, w3), (m2, w2), (m3, w1)}
• A4 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)}
• A5 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w1)}
• A6 = {( m1, w3), (m2, w1), (m3, w2)}
It can easily be verified that the players have the following preferences over the possible
matchings:
• Players z1 ∈ {m1, w1} : (A1 >z1 A6 >z1 A4 >z1 A3 >z1 A5 >z1 A2),
• Players z2 ∈ {m2, w2} : (A2 >z2 A1 >z2 A4 >z2 A5 =z2 A6 >z2 A3),
• Players z3 ∈ {m3, w3} : (A3 >z3 A2 >z3 A1 >z3 A4 >z3 A5 =z3 A6).
We obtain that coalition {(m2, w3), (m3, w2)} is blocking matching A1, {(m1, w3), (m3,
w1)} is blocking A2, {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)} is blocking A3 and A5, {(m2, w3), (m3, w2)} is
blocking A4 and A6, and so G has an empty restricted pessimistic core.
Note that any matching in the pessimistic core is pairwise stable under pessimism, and
so the candidates for the pessimistic core are the solutions to the stable marriage problem
given by E−. However, determining whether a given matching belongs to the pessimistic
core is coNP-complete.
Theorem 32. Checking pessimistic core membership is coNP-complete.
Proof. The reduction is similar to that of Theorem 17, except for the addition of several
dummy players to ensure that the grand coalition can always block in the one-to-one
setting when the KNAPSACK instance has a solution. Given I = 〈U, s, v, B,K〉, let
G = (M,W,Π) such that M = {x1, . . . , x2n,m1,m2}, W = {y1, . . . , y2n, w1, w2}, and Π
with non-zero entries:
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• Π(xi, yi|m1) = Π(xi, yn+i|m1) = −s(ui) and Π(xi, yi|w1) = Π(xi, yn+i|w1) = v(ui),
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
• Π(m2, w2|m1) = −B − ε and Π(m2, w2|w1) = K − ε, for some 0 < ε < 1
• Π(m1, w|w) = Π(m,w1|m) = −1, for all w ∈ W \ {w1} and m ∈M \ {m1}
Let matching A = {(m2, w2), (m1), (w1), (x1), . . . , (x2n), (y1), . . . , (y2n)}. It can be easily
verified that if I has a solution U
′ ⊆ U , the grand coalition can block through matching:
AB =
(⋃




ui 6∈U ′{(xi, yn+i+1), (xn+i+1, yi)}
)
∪{(m1, w1), (m2), (w2)},
where x2n+1 = x1 and y2n+1 = y1.
Conversely, if A is blocked by a coalition B through some matching AB, the only
players that could improve their utility compared to A are m1 and w1. It can be shown
that the matches with non-zero externalities in AB can be used to give a solution to the I
instance.
Theorem 33. Checking nonemptiness of the pessimistic core is NP-hard.
Proof. The reduction is similar to that of Theorem 16, except for the addition of several
dummy players to ensure that the grand coalition can always block in the one-to-one
setting when the KNAPSACK instance has a solution. Given I = 〈U, s, v, B,K〉, let
G = (M,W,Π) such that M = {x1, . . . , x2n,m1,m2}, W = {y1, . . . , y2n, w}, and Π with
non-zero entries:
• Π(xi, yi|m1) = Π(xi, yn+i|m1) = −s(ui) and Π(xi, yi|w) = Π(xi, yn+i|w) = v(ui),
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
• Π(m1, w|m1) = −B
• Π(m2, w|m2) = K −
∑
ui∈U v(ui)
• Π(xj, w|xj) = −1 and Π(mi, yj|yj) = −1, ∀i ∈ {1, 2} and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}
Let matching A = {(m1), (m2), (w), (x1), . . . , (x2n), (y1), . . . , (y2n)}. Similarly to Theo-
rem 16, A belongs to the pessimistic core if and only if the KNAPSACK instance has a
solution.
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Checking membership to the restricted pessimistic core can also be shown to be coNP-
complete, by using a reduction from the following NP-complete problem.
EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C)
Input : Pair (R, S), where R = {1, . . . , n} and S =
⋃
r,s,t(r, s, t) is a collection of 3-element
subsets of R.
Question : Does S contain an exact cover of R, that is, a collection S
′ ⊆ S such that
every element of R occurs in exactly one member of S
′
?
Theorem 34. Checking restricted pessimistic core membership is coNP-complete.
Proof. Given instance (R, S) of X3C, we construct a pair (G,A), where G is a matching
game with non-negative Π and A a matching, such that A has a blocking coalition under
pessimism if and only if (R, S) admits an exact cover. First note that given a coalition B,
it can be verified in O(n3) if B is blocking for A.
For each r ∈ R, construct two players r and dr, such that Π(r, dr|r) = 2n + 2 and
Π(r, dr|dr) = 1. For each unordered triple (r, s, t) ∈ S, construct six players:
{Xrr,s,t, Xsr,s,t, X tr,s,t, Y rr,s,t, Y sr,s,t, Y tr,s,t}
such that ∀z ∈ {r, s, t}, Π has the following values:
• Π(Xzr,s,t, Y zr,s,t | Xzr,s,t) = 5
• Π(Xzr,s,t, Y zr,s,t|Y zr,s,t) = 1
• Π(z,Xzr,s,t|z) = 5
• Π(z,Xzr,s,t|Xzr,s,t) = 2
• For all v 6= z, v ∈ {r, s, t}: Π(v,Xvr,s,t|Xzr,s,t) = 2
• For all w ∈ R \ {z}: Π(z,Xzr,s,t|w) = 2
The unspecified Π entries are set to zero. Note that since the triple (r, s, t) is unordered,
Xrr,s,t = X
r
s,r,t, for example. Let G = (M,W,Π) be a matching game given by
• M = R ∪
(⋃










(r,s,t)∈S{Xrr,s,t, Xsr,s,t, X tr,s,t}
)
,
• Π as specified above.









{(Xrr,s,t, Y rr,s,t), (Xsr,s,t, Y sr,s,t)(X tr,s,t, Y tr,s,t)}

We claim that A has a blocking coalition if and only if the X3C instance has an exact






For each r ∈ R, let (r, sr, tr) ∈ T be the triplet that r belongs to in the T cover. Note that
player r’s utility in A is:
u(r, A) = Π(r, dr|r) = 2n+ 2
while player Xr,sr,tr has utility:
u(Xr,sr,tr , A) = Π(Xr,sr,tr , Yr,sr,tr |Xr,sr,tr) = 5
In addition, u(dr, A) = Π(r, dr|dr) = 1 and u(Yr,sr,tr , A) = Π(Xr,sr,tr , Yr,sr,tr |Yr,sr,tr) = 1.
If deviating with B∗, player r obtains utility:
u(r, B∗) = Π(r,Xrr,sr,tr |r) +
∑
z∈R\{r}
Π(z,Xzz,sz ,tz |r) = 5 + 2(n− 1) = 2n+ 3
For each z ∈ {r, s, t}, player Xzr,s,t receives the following utility if deviating with B∗:
u(Xzr,s,t, B
∗) = Π(z,Xzr,s,t|Xzr,s,t) +
∑
v∈{r,s,t}\{z}
Π(v,Xvr,s,t|Xzr,s,t) = 2 + 2 + 2 = 6
Thus each member of B∗ improves with the deviation, and so B∗ is a blocking coalition
for A.
Conversely, assume that A has a blocking coalition. Observe that each of dr and Y
r
r,s,t
achieve their maximum possible utility in A, and so these players cannot be involved in
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{Xrr,s,t, Xsr,s,t, X tr,s,t}

Since a blocking coalition must contain players from both M and W , R ⊂M , and no Xzr,s,t
is a member of M , it follows that B contains at least one player r from R. Let |B∩R| = k
and denote by Xrr,s,t the player that r is matched with in B, for some s, t ∈ R. Player r
is pessimistic, so when deviating, will assume that all of R \ B are matched in the worst
possible way for him. That is, r assumes that each v ∈ R\B remains matched with dv, and
r cannot expect any utility from externalities formed outside B. Then player r’s estimated
utility in B is:
u(r, B) = Π(r,Xrr,s,t|r) +
∑
z∈(B∩R)\{r}
Π(z,Xzz,sz ,tz |r) = 5 + 2(k − 1) = 2k + 3
where Xzz,sz ,tz is player z’s match in B. For r to be blocking, it must be that u(r, B) >
u(r, A), which is equivalent to 2k + 3 > 2n+ 2, i.e. k ≥ n.
That is, if A has a blocking coalition, it must involve all the members of R. Consider
now the players of the form Xrr,s,t for some (r, s, t) ∈ S. Since Xrr,s,t is deviating, the player
can no longer be matched with Y rr,s,t. Thus player X
r
r,s,t can receive utility only from: (a)
her own match with r, (b) the externality of (s,Xsr,s,t), and (c) the externality of (t,X
t
r,s,t),
in case these matches form. Thus
u(Xrr,s,t, B) ≤ Π(r,Xrr,s,t|Xrr,s,t) + Π(s,Xsr,s,t|Xrr,s,t) + Π(t,X tr,s,t|Xrr,s,t) = 6
Since u(Xrr,s,t, A) = 5, it must be the case that all of the matches (a), (b), and (c) form,
and so for every player Xrr,s,t that participates in blocking, all three matches (z,X
z
r,s,t),
∀z ∈ {r, s, t} form. For each player r ∈ R, denote by (r, sr, tr) the triplet that r is matched








Definition 35 (Neutral Core). Matching A belongs to the neutral core if no coalition B
can block under the assumption that N \B will not react to their deviation.
We note that neutral stability may seem unreasonable in the context of one-to-one
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matchings, since at first sight it implies that the previous partners of a deviating pair
will not form a match with each other. However, the important idea underlying neutral
stability is that the deviating pair uses the neutral stability value to estimate the value
they may be getting if they deviate. This does not necessarily imply that they assume the
rest of the players will remain matched the same way as before.
Theorem 35. A neutral pairwise stable matching can be computed in O(n2) when Π is
non-negative.
Proof. First note that Algorithm 3.6.1 runs in O(n2). Let A be the matching returned by
Algorithm 3.6.1 and assume by contradiction that A is not stable under neutral pairwise
stability. Then there exists some deviation (m,w
′
), where the matches of the two players




), respectively. For (m,w
′
) to be blocking, it must be the case
that




, A) = Π(m
′
, w
′ |w′) + ext(w′ , A) < Π(m,w′|w′) + ext(w′ , A)− Π(m,w|w′)
The two conditions are equivalent to





′ |w′) < Π(m,w′ |w′)− Π(m,w|w′) ≤ Π(m,w′ |w′)
By using the notation in Algorithm 3.6.1, Inequalities (1) and (2) imply that Em(w) <
Em(w
′
) and Ew′ (m
′
) < Ew′ (m), which is equivalent to the pair (m,w
′
) being blocking in
A under the preferences given by E. However A is the result of running the Gale-Shapley
algorithm on (M,W,E), and so A must be stable. This is a contradiction, thus A is
pairwise stable under neutrality.
However, as the next example illustrates, when Π can be negative the existence of a
neutral pairwise-stable matching is no longer guaranteed.
Example 10 (Empty Neutral Pairwise-Stable Set). Let G = (M,W,Π), where M =
{m1,m2}, W = {w1, w2}, and Π as follows:
• Π(mi, wj|mi) = Π(mi, wj|wj) = 1, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}
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• Π(mi, wj|z) = −1, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2} and z 6= mi, wj
Since all the edges have positive values for their endpoints, the only candidates for neutral
pairwise stability are:
• A1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}
• A2 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}
However, matching A1 is blocked by the pair (m1, w2), while A2 is blocked by (m1, w1).
The next example illustrates the separation between the neutral pairwise-stable set and
the neutral core.
Example 11 (Empty Neutral Core). Let G = (M,W,Π), where M = {m1,m2}, W =
{w1, w2}, and Π as follows:
• Π(mi, wj|mi) = Π(mi, wj|wj) = −ε
• Π(mi, wj|z) = W  ε > 0, where z ∈ N \ {mi, wj}, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
All of the matchings in which at least one edge forms, such as:
• A1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}
• A2 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}
• A3 = {(m1, w1), {m2}, {w2}}
fail individual rationality, since both players m1 and w1 can sever edge (m1, w1), and in-
crease their utility by doing so. The “empty” matching:
A0 = {{m1}, {m2}, {w1}, {w2}}
gives utility of zero to all the players, and is blocked by the grand coalition, which can agree
to form matching A1, and obtain the following utility for all the players:
u(z, A1) = W − ε > 0 = u(z, A0),∀z ∈ N
Thus G has an empty neutral core, while matching A0 satisfies neutral pairwise stability.
We contrast this with the pessimistic core of G, which consists of matchings A1 and A2,
and with the neutral pairwise stable set, which consists of matching A0.
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We have the following results with respect to the complexity of the neutral core.
Theorem 36. Checking neutral core membership is coNP-complete.
Proof. The same reduction as in Theorem 17 applies, by noting that the weights are set
such that any feasible matching (from the perspective of the xi and yi players) is one-to-
one. In other words, a coalition can block the matching constructed in Theorem 17 if and
only if it is a one-to-one matching.
Theorem 37. Checking nonemptiness of the neutral core is NP-hard.
Proof. The same reduction as in Theorem 16 applies, by noting that the weights are set up
such that any feasible matching (from the perspective of the xi and yi players) is one-to-
one, and so a matching of the game in Theorem 16 is stable if and only if it is a one-to-one
matching.
3.6.3 Optimistic Stability
Definition 36 (Optimistic Core). Matching A belongs to the optimistic core if there is no
coalition B that can block under the assumption that the players in N \B react in the best
possibly way for B.
That is, when coalition B considers deviation A
′
from A, every player z ∈ B evaluates
the deviation assuming the players in N \ B will organize themselves in the best possible
way for z.
Similarly to the result for many-to-many matchings (Theorem 38), the optimistic pair-
wise stable set is equivalent to the optimistic core in the one-to-one setting.
Example 12. (Empty Optimistic Core) Let M = {m1,m2, p1}, W = {w1, w2, p2}, and Π
defined as follows:
• Π(mi, wj|mi) = Π(mi, wj|wj) = 1,∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}
• Π(p1, p2|p1) = Π(p1, p2|p2) = 1
• Π(p1, wi|p1) = Π(mi, p2) = ε, where 0 < ε < 1
• Π(p1, wi|z) = Π(mi, p2|z) = +∞, ∀z ∈ {m1,m2, w1, w2}
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All the remaining Π values are set to zero. Note that pair (p1, p2) forms in any stable
structure, since both p1 and p2 receive their maximum utility when matched with each
other, and they do not get any utility from externalities. Thus if the optimistic core is
non-empty, it can only contain the following two matchings:
• A1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (p1, p2)}
• A2 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (p1, p2)}
In both A1 and A2, each of the players m1,m2, w1, w2 receive utility of 1. The pair (m1, w2)
is blocking A1, since both m1 and w2 hope that matching
A∗ = {(m1, w2), (m2, p2), (p1, w1)}
arises as a result of the deviation, giving both of them utility:
u(m1, A
∗) = Π(m1, w2|m1) + Π(m2, p2|m1) + Π(p1, w1|m1) = 1 +∞+∞ = +∞
Similarly, A2 is blocked by (m1, w1), who hope that
A∗∗ = {(m1, w1), (m2, p2), (p1, w2)}
arises as a result of the deviation. Thus the game has an empty optimistic core. On the
other hand, the pessimistic and neutral cores of G are non-empty, and consist of matchings:
{A1, A2}.
Theorem 38. The optimistic pairwise stable set is equivalent to the weak core.
Proof. Let A be any matching. If a coalition C is blocking for A, then there must exist pair
(m,w) that forms in C as a result of the deviation. The best value that (m,w) can hope
for while deviating with C is bounded by the best value that (m,w) can obtain in general.
It follows that (m,w) is also blocking for A. Thus if A is pairwise stable under optimistim,
then A also belongs to the optimistic core. The reverse inclusion holds trivially, and so the
core is equivalent to the pairwise stable set under optimism.
Theorem 39. Checking nonemptiness of the optimistic core is NP-complete.
Proof. First note that similarly to the optimistic setwise-stable set, checking nonemptiness
of the optimistic core is in NP. Given a matching A, the utility of each player z ∈ N
in A can be computed in O(n2). In addition, for every pair (m,w) ∈ (M,W ), we can
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again compute in O(n2) the best case utilities of m and w when matched with each other.
Verifying if A is stable can be done by iterating over all pairs (m,w) and checking in O(1)
if both m and w can (weakly) improve by deviating under optimism, compared to their
current utility in A. The same reduction as in Theorem 16 applies, by noting that the
weights are constructed such that any feasible matching (from the perspective of the xi
and yi players) is one-to-one.
Moreover, the problem of checking nonemptiness of the optimistic pairwise stable set
remains NP -complete even when Π is non-negative. We contrast this with Algorithm 3.6.1
and Algorithm 3.6.1 for computing a (restricted) pessimistic and neutral pairwise stable
matching. We provide a proof using a reduction from the NP -complete problem Exact
Cover by 3-Sets.
Theorem 40. Checking nonemptiness of the optimistic core is NP -complete even when Π
is non-negative.
Proof. We provide a reduction from X3C. Given instance (R, S) of X3C, we construct
matching game G, such that G has a non-empty optimistic core if and only if (R, S)
admits an exact cover.
For each r ∈ R, construct a matching game Gr = (Mr,Wr,Πr), where:
• Mr = {mr1,mr2, pr1}
• Wr = {wr1, wr2, pr2}
• Π is set as in Example 12
We refer to pr1 as the “representative” of r, and note that the game (Mr \{pr1},Wr,Πr) has
a nonempty optimistic core. In particular, the following matching is stable:
Ar = {(mr1, pr2), (mr2, wr2), {wr1}}
In addition, for each unordered triple (r, s, t) ∈ S, let there be “committee members”
Xr,s,t = {xrr,s,t, xsr,s,t, xtr,s,t} with the role of bringing the triple (r, s, t) together, and dummy
players Yr,s,t = {yrr,s,t, ysr,s,t, ytr,s,t}, to be matched with Xr,s,t in case (r, s, t) is not chosen in
the cover.
Denote edge (xrr,s,t, p
r
1) by er,s,t, and let its influence be the following:
Π(err,s,t|z) = 15,∀z ∈ {pr1} ∪Xr,s,t
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Similarly for esr,s,t and e
t
r,s,t.
Thus if a matching contains the set of edges:
Ar,s,t = {(xrr,s,t, pr1), (xsr,s,t, ps1), (xtr,s,t, pt1)},
then each player in Xr,s,t receives utility 45. The non-zero Π values for Yr,s,t are set as
follows, for all i, j ∈ {r, s, t}, i 6= j:




• Π(xir,s,t, yir,s,t|yir,s,t) = 1
Thus when the following matching forms:
Br,s,t = {(xrr,s,t, yrr,s,t), (xsr,s,t, ysr,s,t), (xtr,s,t, ytr,s,t)},
we have that u(xir,s,t) = 38 and u(y
i
r,s,t) = 1.
















• Π as above, with all unspecified values set to zero.
We now show that the X3C instance has an exact cover if and only if G has a stable
optimistic core. If (R, S) has an exact cover T ⊆ S, then the following matching belongs

















Observe that everyone obtains their maximum possible utility in A∗(T ), except:
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• The players in Xr,s,t, for all (r, s, t) ∈ S \ T , which form matching Br,s,t. For each
z ∈ {r, s, t}, player Xzr,s,t is matched with their “dummy” pair, Y zr,s,t, obtaining utility
38. The most that Xzr,s,t can hope for, if deviating from Br,s,t, is a utility of 30, which







• The players in Yr,s,t, for all (r, s, t) ∈ T . Each player Y zr,s,t is not influenced by any
externality, and can only receive a utility of 1 when matched with Xzr,s,t. Thus they
have no incentive to block with any other player.
Conversely, assume that (M,W,Π) has a nonempty optimistic core, and let A be a
stable matching. Note that A cannot contain any match of the form (pr1, p
r
2),∀r ∈ R (see
Example 12). Thus it must be that every pr1 is matched with a x
r
r,s,t, for some (r, s, t) ∈ S.












show this by considering the alternatives:









respectively, while xtr,s,t is matched with y
t







1|xrr,s,t)+Π(xsr,s,t, ps1|xrr,s,t)+Π(xtr,s,t, ytr,s,t|xrr,s,t) = 15+15+12 = 42,





Player xrr,s,t hopes that matching
{(xrr,s,t, yrr,s,t), (xsr,s,t, ps1), (xtr,s,t, pt1)}







r,s,t|xrr,s,t) + Π(xsr,s,t, ps1|xrr,s,t) + Π(xtr,s,t, pt1|xrr,s,t) =
14 + 15 + 15 = 44 > 42,







r,s,t|yrr,s,t) = 1 > 0
Case (d): One of the players in Xr,s,t, say x
r







are matched with ysr,s,t and y
t







1|xrr,s,t) + Π(xsr,s,t, ysr,s,t|xrr,s,t) + Π(xtr,s,t, ytr,s,t|xrr,s,t) = 39,
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r,s,t) is blocking. Player x
r
r,s,t hopes that the
following matching arises after the deviation:






1|xrr,s,t) + Π(xsr,s,t, ps1|xrr,s,t) + Π(xtr,s,t, pt1|xrr,s,t) =
14 + 15 + 15 = 44 > 39,







r,s,t|yrr,s,t) = 1 > 0
Thus cases (c) and (d) are not feasible in a stable matching, and so for every set Xr,s,t,
one of (a), (b) must hold. Hence every representative pr1 is matched with some x
r
r,s,t, and
whenever xrr,s,t is matched with p
r








For every representative pr1, denote by OA(r) the set Xr,s,t containing p
r
1’s pair in match-
ing A, and let OA =
⋃
r∈RO(r, A). Then it follows that A = A
∗(OA), and so OA is an
exact cover for (R, S).
We note that while determining non-emptiness of the optimistic core is NP-complete,
one can implement a more efficient search using the following observation. Denote by
E+m(w) the optimal (best case) utility that player m can get while in a matching with w.
The value E+m(w) can be computed in polynomial time, similarly to E
−
m(w) (Algorithm ??).
In the next theorem we show that any matching belonging to the optimistic core must
satisfy pairwise stability according to E+, and so the search for the optimistic core can be
restricted to those matchings which are pairwise stable under E+m(w).
Lemma 6. Any matching in the optimistic core is pairwise stable under E+.
Proof. Let A be a matching belonging to the optimistic core and assume by contradiction
that A is not stable under E+. Then A has a deviating pair (m,w
′
) under E+, and so the
following hold:
• u(m,A) ≤ E+m(w) < E+m(w
′
)








Table 3.2: Core Stability in One-to-One Matchings with Externalities
Core Optimistic Neutral Pessimistic
Membership P coNP -complete coNP -complete
Nonemptiness NP -complete NP -hard NP -hard
Table 3.3: Pairwise Stability in One-to-One Matchings with Externalities (Π ≥ 0)
Pairwise Stability Optimistic Neutral Restricted Pessimistic Pessimistic
Membership P P P P
Nonemptiness NP -complete P P P
These conditions imply that (m,w
′
) is blocking A under optimism, contradiction with the
stability of A.
Our results with respect to the complexity of one-to-one matchings are summarized in
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.
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3.7 Related Work
Klaus et al [30] consider pairwise and setwise stability, with the weak and strong variants,
in many-to-many matching markets. Echenique et al [18] study several solution concepts,
such as the setwise-stable set, the core, and the bargaining set in many-to-many matchings.
These models do not account for externalities or the boundedness of the players as they use
exponential preference profiles. Externalities in the classical marriage problem have been
introduced by Sasaki and Toda [44], and in one-to-many models by Dutta and Masso [16],
in both cases for complete preference profiles. Certain parallels can be drawn between our
gamma-stability concept and that considered in Sasaki and Toda for one-to-one matchings,
where the deviating pairs have estimations on the reaction of the other players. Never-
theless, the crucial difference is that our general Γ-stability defines how society will react
to the deviation, which may differ from the players’ predictions. In other words, the Γ-
response is always correct, but possibly hard to compute, while the estimations in Sasaki
and Toda can be wrong and even completely unrelated to the preferences.
Weighted preferences have been introduced in matchings by Pini et al. [35], in which the
players rank each other using a numerical value. However, they study solution concepts
different from ours, such as α-stability and link-additive stability, and do not consider
externalities. The work of Laszlo Koczy [32] considers games in partition function form
and formulates a very natural definition of a recursive core for such games, in which the
deviators only deviate if they can be better off, regardless of what equilibrium forms in
the residual game, if any. If the residual game does not have any stable structure, the




Conclusions and Future Work
4.1 Models of Interaction in Social Networks
This work is a step in the direction of understanding network interactions from the perspec-
tive of coalitional game theory. We formulated an intuitive mathematical model, analysed
its welfare and stability properties, gave an approximation of the optimal welfare, and
showed that core stable structures have small world characteristics. We studied the effi-
ciency of the core and proposed two solution concepts with improved welfare guarantees.
This work can be extended in several ways. We would like to look at power indices
and see how the degree and position of a node in the network are correlated with the
welfare of that node in the equilibrium. It would be interesting to characterize the extent
to which a node contributes to social welfare or to stabilizing the game, and to identify
stabilizers in existent networks. It also remains to be determined whether stable structures
are small worlds under general utility functions that reflect homophily. More generally, we
are interested in game theoretic models to simulate the formation of social networks.
Finally, this type of game can be used to formulate alternative solution concepts that
apply to social networks in general. Given that social networks are typically very large,
we are mainly concerned with tractability and universal existence. One such direction is
to take into account the notion of distance: players are likely to try deviating with close
neighbours, rather than with players that are far away in the network.
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4.2 Matchings with Compact Externalities
In this work we introduced the first compact model for matching problems with external-
ities. Our formulation can be easily used to model externalities one-to-one, one-to-many,
and many-to-many matchings. We also defined a general stability concept, Γ stability,
which provides a framework for reasoning about classes of problems and different stability
solution concepts. We studied instantiations of Γ stability in the context of many-to-
many matchings and one-to-one matchings. In many-to-many matchings, we considered
optimistic, pessimistic, neutral, and contractual reasoning under a solution concept called
setwise stability. In one-to-one matchings, we considered optimistic, pessimistic, restricted
pessimistic, and neutral reasoning under the pairwise and core stability solution concepts.
In both the many-to-many and one-to-one settings, we studied the computational com-
plexity of finding stable outcomes and provided both hardness results and polynomial
algorithms.
This work can be extended in several ways. A coherent theory of stability for matchings
with externalities remains to be further developed. The existing work on the stability
of matchings assumes complete preference profiles, which require exponential space and
reasoning abilities on behalf of the players. Such modeling is not realistic when dealing with
bounded rational players. Furthermore, externalities are important in many other domains,
including network formation games. It has been noted that effects due to externalities do
appear in networks [29], however we are not aware of a theory of stability for network
formation games that explicitly takes into account externalities. Since such games usually
involve very large number of players, a compact model of externalities is crucial. Another
possible future direction is to formulate solution concepts that consider recursive reasoning
in the context of matchings, such as the recursive core [32].
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